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The  Decay  of  Rationalism 


By 


Arthur  Holmes 

Assistant  Professor  of  Psychology 
University  of  Pennsylvania 


•FTME  \ 


Philadelphia,  Pa.,  1910 


Decay  of  Rationalism 


BY 


Arthur  Holmes 

Assistant  Professor  of  Psychology 
University  of  Pennsylvania 


THESIS 

Presented  to  the  Faculty  of  the  Graduate  School  of  the  University  of 

Pennsylvania  in  Partial  Fulfilment  of  the  Requirements 

for  the  Degree  of  Ph.  D. 


Philadelphia,  Pa.,    1910 


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KEY  TO  REFERENCES. 

Wherever  possible,  quotations  from  Leibnitz  are  made  from  "The  Phil- 
osophical Works  of  Leibnitz,"  translated  by  George  Martin  Duncan,  1890,  and 
marked  D.  The  same  quotations  are  also  referred  to  the  originals  found  in 
"Die  philosophischen  Schriften  von  Gottfried  W.  Leibniz,"  by  C.  L.  Gerhardt, 
Berlin,  1882,  7  Vols,  and  marked  G. 

THE  FOLLOWING  WORKS  OF  LEIBNITZ  ARE  QUOTED  AND  AB- 
BREVIATED: 
An.   D.  Phil. — Animadversiones  in  partem  generalem  Principorum  Cartesian- 

orum,  G.  V.  4,  pp.  350-392;  D.  pp.  46-63. 
Car.  D.  of  Ex.  G.— Art.  XI,  XII,  XIII,  G.  V.  4,  pp.  393-406.    Trans,  by  D., 

Cartesian  Demonstration  of  the  Existence  of  God,  pp.  132-6. 
L.  &  C— Streitschriften  swischcn  Leibnitz  und  Clarke,  G.  V.  7,  pp.  347-421; 

D.   pp.   287-362. 
L.  Ess. — Sur  PEssay  do  rentendement  humain  de  Monsieur  Locke,  G.  V.  5,  pp. 

14-19,  D.  pp.  94-99. 
M.— Monadology,  (No  subject  in  the  original)  G.  V.  6,  pp.  607-623;  D.  pp.  218- 

232. 
N.  &  G. — Principles  de  la  Nature  et  de  la  Grace,  fondes  en  raison,  G.  V.  6,  pp. 

599-606.    D/pp.   209-217. 
N.  E. — Nouveaux  Essais  sur  PEntendement  par  L'Auteur  Du  Systeme  Monad, 

V,  5,  pp.  39-503;  D.  pp.  287-363. 
O.  of  Th.— De  rerum  originatione  radicaii,  G.  V.  7,  pp.  302-308.  D.  pp.  100-106. 
R.  Met. — De  prima  Philosophic  Emendatione,  et  de  Notione  Substantia,  V.  4, 

pp.  468-70.     D.  pp.  68-70. 
Sp.    Eth. — Ad   Ethicam   B.   d.    Sp.   Bemerkungen   von   Leibniz   zu   den   ersten 

drei  Theilen  der  Ethik,  V.  1,  pp.  131-39;  D.  pp.  11-26. 
Th.  on  Tr. — Meditationes  de  Cognitione,  Veritate  et  Ideis,  G.  V.  4,  pp.  422-26. 

D.  pp.   27-32. 
Wisdom— D  la  Sagesse,  G.  V.  VII,  D.  pp.  82-85.    D.  pp.  205-208. 

WORKS  OF  WOLFF  QUOTED  AND  ABBREVIATED: 
K. — Vernunftige    Gedanken    von    den    Kraften   des    menschlichen    Verstandes, 

5th  E.,  1727,  first  published  in  1712. 
G. — Vernunftige  Gedanken  von  Gott,  der  Welt  und  der  Seele  des  Menschen, 

auch  alien  Dingen  ueberhaupt,  Ed.  1752,  first  pub.  1719. 
L. — Philosophia  Rationalis  sive  Logica,  1728. 
O. — Philosophia  Prima  sive  Ontologia,  1730. 
P.  R—  Psychologia  Rationalis,  1734. 

WORKS  OF  KANT  QUOTED: 

Principorum  primorum  cognitionis   Metaphysicae  nova  Delucidatio,  1755. 

xMetaphysicae  cum  geometria  junctae  usus  in  philosophia  naturali  cuius  speci- 
men I  continet  monadologiam  physicam,  1756. 

Die  falsche  Spitzfindigkeit  der  vier  syllogistischen  Figuren,  1762. 

Der  einzig  mogliche  Beweisgrund  zu  einer  Demonstration  des  Dasseins  Gottes, 
1763. 

Versuch  den  Begriff  der  negativen  Grossen  in  die  Weltweisheit  einzufuhren, 
1763. 

Untersuchung  uber  die  Deutlichkeit  der  Grundsatze  der  naturlichen  Theologie 
und  der  Moral,  1764. 

Traume   eines   Geistersehers,  erlautert  durch   Traume  der  Metaphysik,   1766. 

De  mundi  sensibilis  atque  intellegibilis  forma  et  principiis,  1770. 


&<tO 


>342 


THE  DECAY  OF  RATIONALISM. 
INTRODUCTION. 

German  Rationalism  had  its  origin  in  the  work  of  Leibnitz,  reached  the 
zenith  of  its  development  under  the  leadership  of  Wolff  and  his  contemporaries, 
and  was  superseded  by  the  philosophical  system  of  Kant.  Its  decadence  has 
been  generally  attributed  to  the  influence  of  English  empiricism.  The  salient 
points  of  this  view  are:  (a)  Rationalism  was  superseded  by  the  inductive 
method  after  a  long  controversy  between  English  and  German  thinkers  where- 
in (b)  Leibnitz  sketched  out  the  system  and  especially  advocated  the  theory  of 
innate  ideas  against  Locke;  (c)  Wolff  systematized  and  popularized  Leibnitz 
in  Germany,  and  (d)  Kant,  yielding  at  last  to  empiricism  as  presented  by 
Hume,  was  compelled  to  restate  the  whole  problem  of  experience  in  such  a  way 
as  practically  to  surrender  the  ideals  of  his  school. 

Contrary  to  the  foregoing  opinion,  this  monograph  holds  that  the  most 
important  factor  in  the  passing  of  rationalism  was  its  own  internal  decay.  It 
endeavors  to  show  that  independently  of  the  English  school,  Leibnitz,  Wolff 
and  Kant  were  forced  by  motives  inherent  in  their  own  system  so  to  modify 
their  basic  principles  that  their  original  intention  of  perfecting  an  all-inclusive 
deductive  method  became  impossible.  This  necessity  arose  from  difficulties 
within  and  not  from  without.  Upon  such  a  theory  the  whole  emphasis  is 
shifted  from  external  to  internal  motives. 

Such  a  thesis  does  not,  of  course,  deny  the  presence  of  any  external  effects 
at  all.  All  three  writers  were  amenable  somewhat  to  the  arguments  of  empir- 
icism. Kant,  especially  in  his  later  critical  writings  like  the  Critique,  probably 
had  his  own  independent  view  verified  and  illuminated  by  the  oppostion  of 
Hume.  But  such  influences  were  incidental  only, — corroborations  of  conclu- 
sions already  arrived  at,  revealing  as  much  the  weakness  of  empiricism  as  the 
shortcomings  of  rationalism.  In  short,  denying  the  dictum  of  Hamann,  it  is 
insisted  that  without  a  Hume  there  would  have  been  a  Kant. 

Upon  the  play  of  motives  involved,  the  obscurity  surrounding  this  period 
of  thought  is  evidenced  by  the  varied  opinions  of  commentators.  For  example, 
few  of  them  will  agree  upon  the  precise  time  when  Kant  felt  the  quickening 
influence  of  his  "awakener."  Some  are  cautiously  general  while  others  are 
each  certain  of  conflicting  dates.  Windleband  quotes  a  number  of  authors 
without  himself  hazarding  a  guess;  Falkenberg  mentions  1760;  Ueberweg  is 
vague,  saying  that  it  is  only  "in  a  later  period,  beginning  with  1769,  that  he 
(Kant)  developed  the  critical  philosophy;"  Fischer  points  to  the  Dreams  of  a 
Ghost-Seer  (1766),  marking  the  zenith  of  Hume's  influence  though  he  believes 
it  was  clearly  present  as  early  as  the  treatise  on  Negative  Quantities ;  Hoff ding 
says  "about  1762-1763"  and  Adickes  mentions  "the  latter  part  of  the  sixties." 

Equally  great  is  the  disagreement  upon  the  amount  and  source  of  the  in- 
fluence. Newton,  Locke  and  supremely  Hume  are  mentioned  as  English  con- 
tributors; Euler  is  named  on  the  German  side  with  Kant's  teachers,  Krutzen 
and  Teske;  while  Wolff  is  generally  made  the  forerunner  of  Kant  and  the  echo 
of  Leibnitz.  Though  the  commentators  are  at  such  variance  it  is  still  possible 
to  arrange  them  in  a  progressive  scale  according  to  their  approximation  to  the 
view  of  this  paper. 

As  an  expression  of  what  might  be  called  a  typical  attitude  the  following 
quotation  from  Falkenberg  manages  to  include  nearly  all  the  salient  features: 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

"Kant  felt  himself  to  be  the  silencer  of  skepticism;  but  this  was  because  he  had 
received  the  strongest  impulse  to  the  development  of  his  Critique  of  Knowledge 
from  Hume's  inquiries  concerning  causation.  Brought  up  in  the  dogmatic 
rationalism  of  the  Wolffian  school  to  which  he  remained  true  for  a  considerable 
period  as  a  teacher  and  writer  (till  about  1760)  although  at  the  same  time  he 
was  inquiring  with  an  independent  spirit,  Kant  was  gradually  won  over 
through  the  influence  of  the  English  philosophy  to  the  side  of  empirical  skep- 
ticism. Then  as  the  result,  no  doubt,  of  reading  the  Nouveaux  Essais  of  Leib- 
nitz, published  in  1765,  he  returned  to  his  rationalistic  principles  until,  finally, 
after  a  renewal  of  the  empirical  influences,  he  took  the  position  crystallized  in 
the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  .  .  .  "Wery  little  removed  from  this  view 
though  somewhat  more  distinct  in  its  indication  of  Kant's  pre-Humian  inde- 
pendent spirit,  is  the  opinion  of  Adickes.  "At  the  beginning  of  the  sixties," 
he  says  in  his  Introduction,  "certain  empirical  elements  entered  into  his  exact 
rationalistic  theories.  Through  criticism  of  the  ontological  proof  of  God — an 
endeavor  to  deduce  the  existence  of  God  from  the  idea  of  him — he  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  existence  could  never  be  concluded  from  ideas  alone  but  must 
always  be  given  through  experience.  .  .  .  The  principle  of  rationalism  is 
therefore  given  up,  for  Kant  concludes  that  through  pure  reason  nothing  can 
be  concluded  concerning  the  existence  nor  the  causal  nexus  of  things.  In  the 
course  of  the  sixties,  the  empirical  element  became  continually  more  important 
in  Kant's  thinking  and  is  especially  prominent  in  the  Dreams  of  a  Ghost-Seer. 
(1766)"  .  .  .  According  to  my  opinion,  whether  due  to  the  fact  that  he 
then  flrst  read  the  part  of  the  Essay  cognate  to  his  own  thinking,  or  that  he 
then  first  perceived  the  true  Humian  viewpoint,  the  influence  of  Hume  to  which 
Kant  himself  often  referred  as  the  particular  motive  for  the  Critique,  fell  in 
the  later  sixties."2 

One  of  the  stanchest  upholders  of  the  orthodox  view  is  Kuno  Fischer.  In 
his  History  of  the  New  Philosophy  he  devotes  many  pages  to  the  rationalistic 
development  from  Leibnitz,  and  while  admitting  the  electicism  of  Wolff,  he  is 
emphatic  in  his  declaration  of  Hume's  influence  as  the  sole  cause  of  Kant's 
i evolutionary  change.  The  climax  is  reached  in  his  cry,  "without  Berkely  there 
would  have  been  no  Hume;  and  without  Hume,  no  Kant!" 

He  believes  that  Leibnitz  truly  felt  he  had  established  the  deductive  sys- 
tem, had  rationalized  psychology,  cosmology  and  theology,  though  he  left  no 
system  nor  wrote  in  the  speech  of  his  people.  This  double  duty  was  well  per- 
formed by  Wolff.  "He  formulated  metaphysics  as  it  came  from  Leibnitz  and 
so  founded  the  school  of  German  philosophy  which,  according  to  Bilfinger's 
designation,  is  called  Leibnitzo-Wollfian.  .  .  ."  In  the  process,  however,  the 
essential  opposition  between  empiricism  and  rationalism  compelled  a  compro- 
mise. "When  principles  are  so  deeply  imbedded  in  the  human  soul  as  these 
two  tendencies  of  science,  and  so  fully  expressed  and  developed  as  both  were 
by  Locke  and  Leibnitz,  a  compromise  necessarily  arises  out  of  the  antithesis. 
Hence,  quite  naturally  comes  the  attempt  to  achieve  the  desired  but  yet  unat- 
tained  universal  system  by  the  electic  process.  This  attempt  could  come  only 
from  the  side  of  rationalism  and  was  made  by  Wolff.  At  first  glance  the 
scholastic  form  hides  the  internal  unsystematic  and  incoherent  character  of  the 
whole"  but  it  constantly  crops  out  in  such  open  eclectics  as  Lambert. 

iHistory  of  Modern  Philosophy,  Richard  Falckenberg,  trans.  A.  C.  Arm- 
strong, 1893,  2d  German  edition,  p.  323. 

2Immanuel  Kant's  Critik  der  Reinen  Vernunft,  Dr.  Erich  Adickes,  1889. 


i 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

So  much  for  the  Wolffian  system  in  which  Kant  was  bred  and  early  nour- 
ished. From  the  faith  of  his  early  days  he  departed,  according  to  Fischer, 
and  comes  most  closely  to  complete  skepticism  in  the  Dreams  of  a  Ghost-Seer. 
"Here  I  find  our  philosopher  in  his  greatest  agreement  with  Hume.  He  is  pur- 
suaded  by  the  Scot  that  metaphysics  is  and  can  only  be  a  science  of  the  limits 
of  human  reason.  .  .  .  And  Kant  shares  all  these  conclusions  because  he 
is  agreed  with  Hume  that  our  reason  can  compare  sensations  only  according  to 
the  principles  of  identity  and  contradiction,  and  therefore,  can  conclude  only 
analytically.  .  .  ."  Further,  he  adds  that  "The  influence  of  Hume  upon 
Kant  for  the  latter's  development  to  the  critical  epoch  is  so  important"  that  it 
deseives  special  mention.  "Kant,  already  inclined  toward  empiricism,  accepted 
its  tendency  with  full  determination,  and  followed  it  to  the  skeptical  point  of 
view.  .  .  .  Both  occurred  through  Hume's  influence.  The  one  who  first 
explained  this  view  (i.  e.,  the  concept  of  the  ground  of  reality  is  a  percept)  to 
our  philosopher  and  enlightened  him  upon  this  point,  that  person  served  as 
guide  or  light  for  him  upon  the  road  from  the  Examination  of  Negative  Quant- 
ities to  the  Dreams  of  a  Ghost-Seer.  That  man  was  Hume — he  alone,  and  that 
according  to  Kant's  own  testimony,  so  that  every  doubt  about  it  is  excluded."1 
"We  have  given  the  state  of  the  case  in  completeness  and  it  attests,  first: 
Kanl  in  his  comprehension  of  the  problem  of  the  ground  of  reality,  as  he  formu- 
lated this  question  in  his  Examination  of  Negative  Quantities,  goes  back  to 
Hume  and  to  nobody  else.  It  attests,  secondly,  that  Kant,  when  he  wrote  the 
Dreams  of  a  Ghost-Seer,  thought  as  nearly  as  possible  as  did  Hume  himself 
and  according  to  the  proper  Humian  point  of  view  obtained  from  Hume  him- 
self."2 

While  the  general  view  of  the  influence  of  Hume  upon  Kant  is  admitted 
by  the  historian  Ueberweg,  he  nevertheless  confesses  that  Wolff's  system  was 
not  the  rigidly  rationalistic  scheme  generally  supposed  but  it  contained  many 
empirical  elements  though  in  a  secondary  and  incidental  way.  "On  Kant's  earl- 
iest philosophical  opinions  the  philosophy  of  Wolff  and  the  physics  of  Newton 
have  a  controlling  influence."  "Kant  traces  the  genius  of  his  Critique  of  Rea- 
son to  the  stimulus  which  he  received  from  Hume."  In  his  last  edition  Ueber- 
weg further  says:  "Wolff  appropriated  the  conceptions  of  Leibnitz  .  .  . 
supported  them  partly  by  new  arguments  but  also  partially  modified  them." 
In  general  bis  system  is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  "It  is  possible  to  bring 
rational  knowledge  to  perfection  by  deduction.  For  that  purpose  one  funda- 
mental principle  must  be  found  from  which  everything  can  be  deduced  by  strict 
logic.  This  fundamental  principle  is  for  him  the  Principle  of  Contradiction 
upon  which  is  also  based  the  Principle  of  Sufficient  Reason.     .     .     ." 

"Only  those  judgments  are  true  which  are  derived  from  the  analysis  of 
the  idea  of  the  subject.  True,  many  empirical  elements  are  to  be  found  in 
Wolff's  logical  deductions,  and  it  is  possible  only  by  such  means  to  make  his 
rational  structure  agree  with  the  real  world.  Indeed,  according  to  Wolff  the 
empirical  sciences  .  .  .  are  merely  to  establish  the  reality  of  those  things 
which  have  been  deduced  from  first  principles  in  the  rational  philosophy. 
Merely  corroborations  of  rational  knowledge  are  obtained  through  the  empir- 
ical, and  the  first  kind  only  is  clear  and  distinct,  the  latter  unclear  and  con- 
fused.'* 


iGeschichte  der  neuern  Philosophic,  Kuno  Fischer,  4th  ed.;  1298;  Vol.  4, 
pp.  30-32,  293,  294. 

2Ibid,  p.  295. 

3Friedrich  Ueberwegs,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  der  Neu- 
zeit,  Max  Heinze,  10th  Ed.,  1907,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  227. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

The  more  cautious,  more  analytic  writers  are  represented  by  Windelband, 
who  is  disposed  to  give  Kant  due  credit  for  his  own  independence  of  thought, 
without,  however,  definitely  breaking  with  the  accepted  view.  The  following 
quotations  give  his  position.  Kant  ''was  forced  to  become  convinced  by  his 
own  progressive  criticism  in  his  constant  search  for  truth,  how  little  the  ration- 
alistic school  system  satisfied  that  claim  which  it  made.  But  the  more,  also, 
was  his  vision  sharpened  for  the  limitations  of  that  philosophy  which  empir- 
icism developed  by  the  aid  of  the  psychological  method.  In  studying  David 
Hume  this  came  to  his  consciousness  to  such  a  degree  that  he  grasped'  eagerly 
for  the  aid  which  the  Nouveaux  Essais  of  Leibnitz  seemed  to  offer  toward  mak- 
ing a  metaphysical  science  possible."  1 

"For  Kant's  theoretical  development  the  antithesis  between  the  Leibnitz- 
Wolffian  metaphysics  and  the  Newtonian  natural  philosophy  was  at  the  begin- 
ning of  most  decisive  importance.  '"*   ■ 

"In  theoretical  philosophy  Karit  passed  through  many  reversals.  .  .  . 
In  his  writings  after  1760  he  attained  to  the  insight  that  metaphysics  in  the 
sense  of  rationalism  is  impossible,  that  philosophy  and  mathematics  must  have 
diametrically  opposed  methods,  and  that  philosophy  as  the  empirical  knowledge 
of  the  gfven  cannot  step  beyond  the  circle  of  experience. 

«'  "The  progress  from  there  on  to  the  System  of  Criticism  is  obscure  and  con- 
troverted." Concerning  this  development  and  the  time  of  influence  by  Hume  he 
quotes  a  series  of  authors,  though  he  has  previously  said  that  "the  epistemolog- 
ical  system,  which  he  erected  upon  the  principle  of  virtual  innateness  extended 
to  mathematics,  very  soon  proved  its  untenability  and  this  led  him  to  the  tedi 
ous  investigations  which  occupied  him  in  the  period  from  1770  to  1780  and 
which  found  their  conclusion  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason."1 

A  greater  independence  of  Kant's  development  is  admitted  by  Hoffding, 
who  remarks  that,  though  many  years  later  Kant  announced  Hume  as  his 
awakener,  "it  may  be  noted  as  a  proof  of  the  independence  and  continuity  of 
Kant's  philosophical  thought  that  it  is  impossible  to  find  any  point  in  his  devel- 
opment where  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  assume  a  strong  influence  from 
some  other  author  to  understand  its  subsequent  course."2 

From  these  sources,  indicating  the  more  usual  attitude  toward  this  dis- 
puted period,  we  now  turn  to  an  author  who  expresses  in  many  respects  the 
position  here  taken.  Friederich  Paulsen,  in  his  "Versuch  einer  Entwicldungs- 
geschichte  der  kantischen  Erkenntnisstheorie,"  while  confining  himself  to  a 
more  specific  problem,  yet  frequently  makes  statements  on  the  more  general 
subject  of  rationalism  which  show  his  belief  in  the  inherent  insufficiency  of 
that  system.    One  of  his  clearest  is  the  following: 

"It  remains  further  to  be  shown  how  these  very  principles  of  rationalism 
burdened  from  the  beginning  with  an  internal  uncertainty,  were  brought  into 
Germany.  German  Rationalism  bore  within  itself  the  germ  of  its  own  dissolu- 
tion. In  its  fundamental  principle  the  opposing  tendencies  of  empiricism  and 
pure  rationalism  were  held  together  externally  by  the  proposition  that  by  the 
principle  of  sufficient  reason  truths  of  fact  could  be  known  by  pure  reason 
without  such  truths  being  necessary  according  to  the  law  of  contradiction.   The 


1Windelband,  History  of  Philosophy,  trans.  James  H.  Tufts,  1895,  pp.  633- 
535. 

2Harald  Hoffding,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  trans,  by  B.  E.  Meyer, 
1900,  Vol.  II,  pp.  41,  42. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

two  tendencies  must  of  necessity  fall  apart  as  soon  as  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple should  be  investigated  without  the  special  Leibnitzian  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  assumption."1 

Of  this  fundamental  principle  he  further  says:  "If  one  pursues  the  con- 
sequences of  this  viewpoint  with  reference  to  the  theory  of  knowledge  it  would 
hardly  be  possible  to  arrange  them  in  a  harmonious  result.  From  some  of  them 
it  appears  clearly  enough  that  he  (Liebnitz)  had  in  fact,  given  up  the  possibil- 
ity of  the  knowledge  of  things  by  means  of  pure  reason.  .  .  .  The  com- 
plete agreement  of  the  Leibnitzian  theory  of  knowledge  with  the  English  em- 
piricism is  thereby  expressed.  But  Leibnitz  is  not  to  be  taken  for  an  empiric- 
ist/'2.    The  Nouveaux  Essais  show  that. 

Of  the  attempts  at  rational  construction  made  by  Wolff  and  other  lesser 
disciples  and  elucidators  of  Leibnitz,  Paulsen  is  even  more  caustic  in  his  criti- 
cism. "The  time  between  Leibnitz  and  Kant  for  the  elaboration  of  the  theory 
of  knowledge  in  Germany  is  empty  space"  is  his  summation  of  their  efforts. 
This  opinion  is  modified,  however,  by  the  following:  "While  the  productions  are 
not  insignificant  for  the  comprehension  of  the  problem  which  they  handle,  they 
do  not  bring  it  one.  step  nearer  solution.  The  inner  duality  between  the  ration- 
alistic and  empirical  tendencies  remain  the  same  as  they  were  with  Leibnitz,  or 
are  brought  into  sharper  opposition;  and  one  can  say  that,  insofar  as  the  neces- 
sity for  a  differentiation  between  these  two  halves  was  made  more  stringent, 
just  insofar  is  the  work  of  this  period  not  in  vain.  The  empirical  elements 
which  with  Leibnitz  were  the  weaker,  were  strengthened  by  the  gradual,  pro- 
gressive impulse  of  Lockian  thoughts.  But  they  serve  in  no  way  to  eliminate 
the  rationalistic  principles  of  the  scientific  method  from  the  system,  but  ar- 
range themselves  immediately  with  the  rational  as  useful  and  important  truths. 
Indeed  they  are  so  far  from  being  a  hindrance  that  the  rationalistic  view  re- 
turns  to  more  distinct  and  more   precise  expression."3 

Leibnitz'  "followers,  who  in  spite  of  their  greater  appearance  of  system 
thought  less  connectedly  on  the  whole,  decide  in  favor  of  one  view.  Obeying 
the  nod  of  the  master,  it  is  true,  they  referred  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason 
back  to  the  principle  of  contradiction,  and  thereby  obtained  a  system  of  pure 
rationalism.  This  did  not  hinder  them  from  recognizing  that  from  experience 
some  truths  could  be  gained,  which  could  be  included  in  the  general  body  of 
rationalistic  knowledge  without  further  analysis.  With  Leibnitz  the  opposition 
between  these  elements  was  so  obscured  by  unclearness  that  they  appear 
compatible.  With  these  writers,  however,  the  one-sided  and  more  clearly 
formulated  principles  were  joined  by  mere  juxtaposition  in  one  system." 

"At  the  head  of  the  line  of  those  who  permitted  reason  and  experience  to 
stand  co-ordinated  with  one  another,  stands  Wolff.  .  .  .  Though  he  early 
reduces  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  to  the  law  of  contradiction,  neverthe- 
less he  actually  proceeds  in  such  a  way  as  to  include  empirical  data  in  the  con- 
struction of  his  rationalistic  system.  Until  the  latter  is  completed,  the  empir- 
ical method  can  furnish  useful  material  for  definitions.  .  .  .  How  such  an 
inweaving  of  empirical  elements  in  a  rational,  demonstrative  science  is  possible, 


Wersuch  einer  Entwicklungsgeschichte  der  kantischen  Erkenntnissthe- 
orie,  Dr.  Friedrich  Paulsen,  18757  P-  23. 

Paulsen's  latest  statement  on  his  position  of  1875  is  to  be  found  in  his 
work,  "Immanuel  Kant,  His  Life  and  Doctrine,  2d  ed.  1899,  Part  I,  §V,"  where 
he  says,  "The  results  still  appear  to  me  valid  with  regard  to  essential  points." 

2Ibid,  P.,  pp.  16,  17.    siDid,  pp.  23,  24. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

is  never  the  question  with  Wolff.  One  does  not  do  him  an  injustice,  therefore, 
when  one  says  that  he  really  did  not  have  a  theory  of  knowledge  at  all. 

"This  remains  the  condition  of  things  until  the  time  of  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason."1 

In  dealing  with  the  specific  problem  of  Kant's  development,  after  stating 
that  his  purpose  is  to  give  a  historical  explanation  of  the  Critique,  Paulsen  pro- 
ceeds in  his  Introduction: 

"Kant's  starting  point  is  the  rationalism  reigning  in  Germany  since  the 
time  of  Leibnitz.  At  first  concerned  but  little  with  theories  of  knowledge,  he 
accepted  the  Wolffian  elaboration  of  it.  .  .  .  As  soon,  however,  as  he  be- 
gan to  make  method  prominent  in  his  researches,  he  was  driven  in  another 
direction.  The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  .  .  .  was  the  point  at  which 
he  stumbled.  In  an  independent  development  he  continually  advanced  farther 
from  his  original  position  until  he  assumed  a  view  which  agreed  essentially 
with  the  theory  of  empiricism  as  expressed  in  the  formula:  Knowledge  of 
things  never  comes  from  pure  reason  but  only  from  experience. 

"At  the  end  of  the  sixties  a  contrary  current  set  in.  His  thinking  now 
received  that  direction  in  which  he  remained  and  which  fixed  him  finally  in  the 
to-called  critical  system.  The  impulse  to  this  reconstruction  came  from  th'2 
systematic  study  of  the  English  philosophy  together  with  the  conviction  that 
the  terminus  of  his  previous  empirical  progress  was  complete  skepticism; 
skepticism  in  the  sense  that  general  and  necessary  judgments  concerning  ob- 
jects are  impossible.  As  he  was  not  willing  to  proceed  so  far,  he  was  com- 
pelled completely  to  reform  his  system.  The  result  of  this  step  which  found 
its  final  expression  in  the  Pure  Reason,  after  the  Dissertation  of  1770  had 
fixed  the  general  point  of  view,  is  expressed  in  the  formula:  There  is  a  knowl- 
edge of  objects  from  pure  reason  but  only  of  objects  as  they  are  given  us,  viz., 
in  perceptions.  He  sets  himself  thus  in  opposition  to  both  phases  of  his  previ- 
ous development,  as  much  against  Rationalism  as  against  Empiricism;  or,  ac- 
cording to  his  own  expression,  against  Dogmatism  and  Scepticism.  .  .  . 
The  positive  portion  of  the  Critique,  and,  therefore,  the  new  system  of  knowl- 
tdge,  directs  itself  against  Hume."2 

With  the  foregoing  positions  of  Paulsen  this  monograph  agrees  in  gen- 
eral. Points  of  departure  will  be  more  specifically  touched  upon  as  they  come 
up  in  the  consideration  of  Leibnitz,  Wolff,  and  Kant.  For  the  sake  of  clearness 
it  might  be  well,  however,  to  summarize  them  briefly  at  this  time. 

The  first  large  difference  lies  in  the  emphasis  here  placed  upon  Wolff  and 
his  effect  upon  the  history  of  rationalism.  From  such  a  point  of  view,  the 
"time  between  Leibnitz  and  Kant"  is  anything  but  "empty  space."  Instead  it 
becomes  big  with  explanatory  motives  for  the  future  pre-critical  mutations  of 
Kant.  For,  his  assimilation  of  views  so  new  and  radical  would  be  especially 
difficult  to  explain  if  they  came  from  a  thinker  like  Hume  whose  utterances, 
in  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  could  hardly  conceivably  be  understood 
or  appreciated  by  Kant  until  after  a  comparatively  long  development  away 
from  the  rigorously  deductive  ideals  of  a  Spinoza  or  a  Leibnitz.  Upon  the 
supposition  of  Wolffian  empiricism,  motives  arise  easily  from  tradition,  line- 
age, and  discipleship,  instead  of  being  laboriously  engrafted  from  a  foreign 
school. 

Such  a  fundamental  difference  will  bring  in  its  train  many  other  diver- 

ilbid.,  pp.  24-26. 
2Ibid.,  pp.  1,  2. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

gencies  of  opinion*  One  is  the  placing  of  Wolff  where  Paulsen  places  Kant  as 
late  as  1770,  when  he  says:  "Kant  is  an  empiricist,  but  he  does  not  really  per- 
ceive it  himself."1  Another  is  the  elucidation  of  Kant's  motives,  as  has  just 
been  suggested,  when  certain  motives  are  overlooked  or  differently  assigned  by 
Paulsen,  as  for  example,  in  his  above  quoted  description  of  Kant's  three  posi- 
tions: his  original  Wolffian  rationalism;  his  movement  toward  empiricism;  his 
final  fixation  in  criticism.  For  the  impulse  to  the  last  Paulsen  invokes  a  re- 
vulsion from  skeptical  tendencies  upon  Kant's  first  real  comprehension  of 
Hume.  For  the  impulse  to  the  second  or  empirical  tendency,  our  commentator 
has  several  suggestions,  the  chief  one  being  the  natural  choice  of  the  second 
alternative  when  only  two  appear  on  the  surface  and  one  is  rejected.  He  asks, 
"After  he  had  ceased  to  hold  with  rationalism  that  it  was  reason,  what  might 
Kant  accept  as  the  source  of  our  insight  into  causal  relations?  It  appears 
.  .  .  that  only  one  answer  could  be  expected:  Experience.  Reason  and  ex- 
perience had  been  so  long  and  so  decidedly  opposed  .  .  .  concerning  the 
limits  of  their  influence,  that  every  loss  on  one  side  could  be  assumed  as  gain 
on  the  other.  When  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  was  rejected  from  the 
realm  of  pure  reason  by  Kant,  it  appeared  by  that  very  act  to  be  transplanted 
into  the  realm  of  experience.  ...  If  this  was  not  to  be  longer  known  by 
reason,  how  then  otherwise  could  it  be  known  except  through  experience?" 

In  place  of  such  an  imaginary  motive,  a  real  and  historical  one  may  readily 
be  found  in  the  fact  that  Wolff,  the  avowed  master  of  Kant,  went  exactly  to 
the  same  source  for  his  principles  under  similar  circumstances.  To  make 
Kant's  three  positions  merge  quite  naturally  into  each  other,  it  is  necessary 
merely  to  understand  that  he  began  as  a  disciple  of  Wolff's  superficial  system, 
viz:  rationalism;  but  was  soon  led  along  the  road  toward  skepticism  by  Wolff's 
real  system,  viz.,  logic  beginning  with  empirically  derived  premises;  and  was 
finally  driven  back  toward  real  rationalism,  or  an  examination  of  the  possibil- 
ity of  necessary  premises,  by  the  realization  that  Hume's  skepticism  utterly 
demolished  his  fundamental  and  pet  dogma:  Things  may  be  known  by  reason 
alone.  From  this  point  of  view,  Wolff,  the  avowed  rationalist,  leads  him  to  em- 
piricism; Hume,  the  arch-empiricist,  drives  him  back  to  rationalism. 

The  justice  of  such  a  claim  will  be  determined  by  an  analysis  of  writings 
of  the  philosophers  themselves  permitting,  as  far  as  possible,  each  one  to  tell 
his  own  story. 


ilbid.,  p.  100. 

*Note: — The  comparatively  little  effect  of  Dr.  Paulsen's  able  and  suggestive 
critique  upon  current  theories  of  Kantian  development  would  itself  justify  a 
protagonistic  effort  in  addition  to  any  other  reasons  for  this  monograph. 


SECTION  I. 

THE  RATIONALISM  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

INTRODUCTION. 

Any  connected  account  of  Leibnitz'  epistemology  must  be  gathered  up 
from  many  independent  essays  and  smaller  works.  They  were  usually  hur- 
riedly prepared;  occasionally  written  on  journeys;  sometimes  suggested  by 
specific  inquiries  from  individuals,  and  often  dealt  with  phases  of  larger  prob- 
lems. Consequently  they  do  not  always  fit  with  precision  into  other  parts  of 
his  scheme.  His  letters  were  largely  controversial  and  devoted  to  answering 
objections  with  arguments  not  infrequently  born  of  the  heat  of  the  occasion 
and  not  sound  under  cool  and  searching  analysis. 

On  account  of  the  broken  character  of  his  writings,  his  condensed  and 
hurried  style,  and  the  actual  shifting  of  his  thought,  it  is  extremely  difficult 
to  bring  together  his  multitude  of  opinions  into  one  coherent  whole.  Yet 
through  all  the  obscurity  and  incompleteness  of  his  writing  is  felt  both  the 
sincerity  of  his  attempt  to  deal  with  the  problems  involved,  and  also  the 
strength  of  his  desire  to  bring  the  methods  of  rationalism  to  an  efficiency  capa- 
ble of  meeting  the  demands  of  a  universal  epistemological  method.  There  is 
no  slurring  over  difficult  points.  There  is  no  doubt  about  the  ideal  in  his  mind. 
Whether  the  reader  agrees  with  the  conclusions  or  not,  he  cannot  help  feeling 
the  earnestness  of  the  thinker  and  admiring  the  sturdy  frankness  which  never 
shirks  the  issue  and  the  acutencss  which  never  misses  a  real  point. 

Leibnitz  comes  to  the  analysis  of  experience  with  a  mind  biased  by  an  early 
adherence  to  a  school.  This  bias  already  commits  him  to  the  logical  method 
of  discovering  truth.  He  is  a  Rationalist,  born  and  bred.  The  mathematical 
method  appealed  to  him  as  no  other  did.  Geometry  with  its  few  initial  axioms 
and  its  wealth  of  analytically  derived  theorems,  was  especially  fascinating  to 
this  early  disciple  of  an  original  geometrician  and  himself  an  extender  of  geo- 
metric methods.  "Why  should  not  the  same  processes  be  extended  to  the  whole 
realm  of  knowledge?"  was  a  most  natural  question. 

Therefore,  when  his  mind  is  turned  to  the  reform  of  metaphysics,  he  is 
following  a  familiar  line  of  thought  when  he  says,  "A  certain  particular  plan 
is  necessary  in  exposition  which,  like  the  thread  in  the  Labyrinth,  serves  us,  no 
less  than  the  method  of  Euclid,  for  resolving  our  problem  after  the  manner  of 
calculus,  preseiving  nevertheless,  always  the  clearness  which  in  common  con- 
versation should  not  be  sacrificed." 

Another  heritage  of  the  past  was  his  "duality"  of  experience.  Receiving 
it  without  question,  he  thought  he  found  a  chasm  between  soul  and  body,  be- 
tween idea  and  fact.  To  join  the  latter  two  into  a  logical  whole  was  his 
problem  of  knowledge.  To  this  he  gave  himself  with  the  earnestness  of  an 
original  thinker  and  the  skill  of  a  master  mind,  and  if  his  efforts  served  to 
show  more  the  inherent  impossibilities  of  Rationalism  than  had  hitherto  ap- 
peared, they  nevertheless  brought  that  system  to  as  high  a  pitch  of  perfection 
as  it  attained  at  any  other  time. 

The  recognition  of  a  dualism  is  shown  by  his    fundamental    division    of 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

truths  or  propositions  into  those  of  fact  and  those  of  reason.  A  few  quota- 
tions covering  a  wide  period  of  his  philosophic  activities  will  show  the  im- 
portance of  this  classification  to  him  and  his  steady  adherence  to  it. 

In  1692  he  says,  "In  general,  therefore,  it  may  be  said:  Truths  are  either 
of  fact  or  of  reason."1  In  the  Nouveau  Essais,  his  most  important  work  on 
epistemology,  he  maintains  his  view  that  "Primitive  truths,  which  are  known 
by  intuition,  are  of  two  kinds,  like  the  derivative."2 

He  considers  these  as  important  to  him  as  the  particular  propositions  con- 
cerning existence  and  general  propositions  concerning  abstract  ideas  were  to 
Locke,  for  he  says  of  them,  "Your  (Locke's)  division  appears  to  amount  to 
mine  of  propositions  of  fact  and  propositions  of  reason."3  Again,  nearly  at 
the  end  of  his  life,  he  writes,  "There  are  two  kinds  of  truths,  those  of  reason- 
ing and  those  of  fact."4 

To  combine  these  two  kinds  of  truths  into  one  rationalistic  system  he 
must  overcome  radical  difficulties  in  each.  Among  the  truths  of  reason  he 
must  find  an  idea  which  involves  existence;  among  facts  he  must  find  one 
capable  of  true  definition. 


\ 


lAn.  D.  Phil.,  G.  vol.  4,  p.  357,  D.  p.  48. 
*N.  E.,  Book  IV,  C.  2  §  1. 
»N.  E.,  B.  IV,  Ch.  II,  §  13. 
*M..  8  33. 


CHAPTER  I. 
REDUCTION  OP  TRUTHS  OF  REASON  TO  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD. 

Following  his  mathematical  ideal,  and  beginning  with  truths  of  reason, 
Leibnitz  makes  his  first  advance  by  reducing  all  of  them  to  one,  viz:  the  Prin- 
ciple of  Contradiction  or  Identity. 

"The  first  of  the  truths  of  reason,  as  Aristotle  rightly  observed,  is  the 
principle  of  contradiction,  or,  what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  of  identity."1 

"Nothing  ought  to  be  taken  as  primitive  principles  except  experiences  and 
the  axiom  of  identity,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  contradiction,  which  is  prim- 
itive, since  otherwise  there  would  be  no  difference  between  truth  and  false- 
hood."2 Thus  it  becomes  the  definition  or  criterion  not  only  of  all  truth,  by 
"virtue  of  which  we  judge  that  to  be  false  which  involves  it  and  that  true 
which  is  opposed  or  contradictory  to  the  false,"3  but  also  the  definition  of  truths 
of  reason  which  "are  necessary  and  their  opposites  impossible."4 

In  its  most  general  form  this  principle  is  an  identical  proposition,  taking 
the  form  of  A  is  A,  and  seeming  to  repeat  the  same  thing  without  giving  any 
information.  It  "cannot  be  proved,  and  indeed  needs  no  proof  .  .  .  the 
opposition  of  which  contains  express  contradictions."5 

This  reduction  did  two  things:  closed  the  circuit  by  finding  the  test  of 
truth  within  a  proposition  in  its  own  self-contradiction,  and  secondly  reduced 
the  terms,  or  subject  and  predicate,  of  these  truths  practically  to  one.  These 
terms  are  the  limits  of  analysis  and  the  elements  of  knowledge.  They  form 
definitions,  but  are  themselves  undefined,  as  a  few  quotations  will  show.  "We 
have,  however,  a  distinct  knowledge  of  an  indefinable  thing  when  it  is  primi- 
tive, or  when  it  is  only  a  mark  of  itself,  that  is,  when  it  is  irreducible  and  is 
only  understood  through  itself."6 

In  a  broader  sense  knowledge  "is  found  in  ideas  or  terms  before  we  come 
to  propositions  or  truths."7 

"When  we  have  pushed  the  analysis  to  the  end  .  .  .  when  we  finally 
come  to  the  consideration  of  some  natures  which  are  understood  only  through 
themselves  .  .  .  and  which  need  nothing  outside  of  themselves  in  order  to 
be  conceived,  we  have  reached  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  thing."8 

This  movement  has  progressed  so  far  with  perfect  smoothness  toward  that 
much-to-be-desired  "term"  or  "idea"  which  shall  include  existence  within  itself 
as  its  essence.  Just  here,  however,  a  very  practical  consideration  occurs  to 
Leibnitz  and  he  asks,  "Now,  is  it  possible  that  men  should  ever  construct  a 
perfect  analysis  of  notions,  or  that  they  should  reduce  their  thoughts  down  to 


Note. — Leibnitz  nowhere  makes  clear  the  intermediate  steps  between  any 
general  truth  and  the  principle  of  contradiction.  His  method  in  general  is 
given  in  "Wisdom,"  Art.  1,  2,  and  3,  and  in  the  Monadology. 

iAn.  D.  Phil.,  On  Art.  7. 

2L.  Ess.,  G.  V.  5,  p.  14;  D.  p.  94. 

3M.,  §  31. 

4M.,  §  33. 

5M.,  §  35. 

«Th.  on  Tr.,  G.  V.  4,  p.  423:  D.,  p.  28. 

7N.  E.,  B.  IV,  C.  1,  §  1. 

sWisdom,  §  3. 


^ 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

first  possibilities,  to  irreducible  notions,  or  what  is  the  same  thing,  down  to 
the  absolute  attributes  of  God;  that  is,  to  the  first  causes  and  to  the  final  rea- 
son of  things?     I  should  not  dare  actually  to  decide  this  question."1 

However,  the  conclusion  of  the  ideal  process  would  result  in  one  term  or 
idea.  The  notion  of  substance  he  finds  "so  fruitful  that  from  it  first  truths,  even 
those  which  concern  God  and  souls  and  the  nature  of  bodies  follow."2 

Before  this  fertile  notion  can  be  fully  accepted,  however,  it  must  needs  be 
tested.  The  idea  must  be  shown  to  be  possible,  for  "we  cannot  safely  use  defini- 
tions before  knowing  whether  they  are  real  and  do  not  involve  any  contradic- 
tion. The  reason  of  this  is  that  if  the  ideas  involve  contradiction,  opposite 
things  may  be  concluded  at  the  same  time,  which  is  absurd."3  An  example  of 
such  an  idea  is  that  of  a  quickest  motion,  the  conception  of  which  turns  out  to 
be  impossible. 

Further,  after  this  test  has  been  passed,  to  become  the  longed-for  idea 
involving  existence,  the  idea  of  substance  must  fulfill  still  another  condition. 
Even  if  an  idea  is  true,  it  is  not  always  certain  that  existence  follows,  for 
"true  or  real  ideas  are  those  of  the  possibility  of  whose  fulfillment  we  are  as- 
sured; the  others  are  doubtful;  or  (in  case  of  proof  of  impossibility)  chimer- 
ical."4 To  possibility  must  be  added  necessity  of  existence. 

"And  thus  it  is  that  the  final  reason  of  things  must  be  found  in  a  neces- 
sary substance  .      .      .  and  this  it  is  which  we  call  God."5 

God  possesses  "a  great  advantage  over  all  other  things"  in  this  respect. 
"For  it  is  sufficient  to  prove  that  he  is  possible,  to  prove  that  he  exists,  a  thing 
not  encountered  anywhere  else  that  I  know  of.  Furthermore,  I  infer  from 
this  that  there  is  a  presumption  that  God  exists,  for  there  is  always  a  pre- 
sumption on  the  side  of*  possibility.  .  .  .  This  may  suffice  for  practical 
life,  but  it  is  not  sufficient  for  a  demonstration."6 

This  argument  does  not  rest  upon  the  perfections  of  God  for  "omitting  all 
mention  of  perfection,  it  may  be  said  that  if  necessary  being  is  possible  it  ex- 
ists." This  can  be  done  "by  simply  saying  that  God  is  a  being  of  itself  or  prim- 
itive, ens  a  se,  that  is,  which  exists  by  its  essence."  From  this  "it  is  easy  to 
conclude  .  .  .  that  such  a  thing,  if  it  is  possible,  exists;  or  rather,  this 
conclusion  is  a  corollary  which  is  desired  immediately  from  the  definition,  and 
hardly  differs  from  it.  .  .  .  And  if  being  of  itself  were  defined  in  terms 
still  nearer,  by  saying  that  it  is  being  which  must  exist  if  it  is  possible,  it  is 
manifest  that  all  that  could  be  said  against  the  existence  of  such  a  thing  would 
be  to  deny  its  possibility." 

"On  this  subject  we  might  again  make  a  modal  proposition  which  would 
oc  one  of  the  best  fruits  of  all  logic,  viz:  that  if  necessary  being  is  possible,  it 
exists.  For  necessary  being  and  being  by  its  essence  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
Thus  the  reasoning  taken  with  this  bias  appears  to  have  solidity;  and  those 
who  will  have  it  that  from  mere  notions,  ideas,  definitions  or  possible  essences, 
actual  existence  can  never  be  inferred,  in  truth  fall  into  what  I  have  just  said, 
namely,  they  deny  the  possibility  of  being  of  itself.     ...     If  being  of  itself 


xTh.  on  Tr.,  G.  V.  4,  p.  425;  D.,  p.  31.     Example  of  numbers  approaches 
it 

2R.  Met.,  G.  V.  4,  p  469;  D.,  p.  69. 
3Th.  on  Tr.,  G.  V.  4,  p.  423;  D.  p.  29. 
*L.  Ess.,  G.  V.,  p.  15;  D.  p.  95. 
»M.,  §  38. 
«Car.  D.  Ex.  G.,  G.  V.  4,  p.  394;  D.  134. 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    LEIBNITZ. 

is  impossible,  all  beings  by  others  are  so  also;  since  they  exist  ultimately  only 
through  being  of  itself;  thus  nothing  could  exist.  This  reasoning  leads  us  to 
another  important  modal  proposition,  equal  to  the  preceding,  and  which  joined 
with  it,  completes  the  demonstration.  It  might  be  expressed  thus:  If  necessary 
being  is  not,  there  is  no  being  possible.  It  seems  that  this  demonstration  has 
not  been  carried  so  far  up  to  this  time."1 


Note. — The  solution  of  the  problem  might  have  been  also  illustrated  by 
the  use  of  the  ens  perfectissiw,um,  but  this  argument  has  been  chosen  since  it 
seems  to  present  a  more  simple  rationalistic  scheme,  avoiding  as  it  does  the 
necessity  of  assuming  that  a  perfect  being  possesses  all  attributes  and  that  ex- 
istence, as  a  part,  is  contained  in  this  all.  For  Leibnitz's  remarks  on  this  dem- 
onstration, see,  Nouveaux  Essais,  B.  IV  C  X,  §  §  2-6. 

*Ibid,  G.  V.  4,  p.  405-406;  D.  p.  137-138. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Contingent  Truths  or  Facts. 

However  easily  the  bloodless  truths  of  reason  may  be  fitted  into  a  logical 
scheme,  facts  stand  for  eternal  independence.  Each  one  rests  so  sturdily  upon 
its  own  bottom;  each  insists  so  persitently  upon  its  own  individuality.  They 
have  always  been  stubborn  things  for  the  rationalist.  They  refuse  to  be 
represented  by  any  general  idea  or  described  by  any  definition.  Doubly  then 
did  they  resent  efforts  to  make  them  but  secondary  dependents  upon  general 
ideas. 

Leibnitz  recognizes  this  peculiar  difficulty  and  bends  all  his  genius  to  the 
task  of  bringing  facts  under  the  rationalistic  sway.  While  he  does  not  grant 
them  a  primacy,  nor  co-ordinate  them  with  general  notions,  he  does  recognize 
them  in  a  way  and  accords  them  the  importance  of  a  grand  division  in  his 
system. 

"In  general,  therefore,  it  may  be  said:  Truths  are  either  of  fact  or  of 
reason.   .      .      ."* 

"Primitive  truths,  which  are  known  by  intution,  are  of  two  kinds,  like  the 
derivative.  They  are  either  truths  of  reason  or  truths  of  fact.'*2 

Having  thus  recognized  them,  his  task  is  to  connect  them  with  this  prim- 
itive substance  in  such  a  way  that  they  may  be  derived  from  it  by  logical  analy- 
sis. 

His  first  step  in  this  direction  is  the  reduction  of  these  facts,  which  are 
"as  many  as  the  immediate  perceptions,  or  those  of  consciousness,"  to  two,  "/ 
think,  and  various  things  are  thought  by  me."3 

These  truths  he  calls  contingent.  Contingent  truths  or  facts  may  be  defined 
as  those  "the  essense  of  which  does  not  involve  existence."4  They  belong  to 
that  class  of  things  whose  reason  cannot  be  found  in  themselves  for  the  suffi- 
cient reason  of  existence  can  be  found  neither  in  any  particular  thing  nor  in  the 
whole  aggregate  of  series."5 

Hence  they  may  be  defined  generally  by  the  second  great  principle  of  Leib- 
nitz's system,  viz.,  that  of  Sufficient  Reason.*  For  "our  reasonings  are  founded 
on  two  great  principles,  that  of  contradiction.  .  .  .  and  that  of  sufficient 
reason,  by  virtue  of  which  we  consider  that  no  fact  can  be  real  or  existent,  no 
statement  true,  unless  there  is  a  sufficient  reason  why  it  is  so  and  not  other- 
wise."6 

Having  thus  classified  these  truths  as  contingents,  Leibnitz  is  ready  to 
begin  his  real  task  of  relating  them  to  his  primal  notion.  He  does  this  in  two 
stages. 

First,  he  makes  their  very  lack  of  necessity  lead  to  necessity.  By  their 
nature  as  defined  in  the  fundamental  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  an  analysis 
of  them  would  lead  to  a  regressus  ad  infinitum  and  "to  whatever  anterior  state 
you  may  go  back  you  will  never  find  there  a  perfect  reason  why  forsooth  there 
in  any  world  at  all."7 


iAn.  D.  Phil.,  Art.  7.     Also  M.,  §  33. 

2N.  E.,  B.  IV,  C.  II,  §  1. 

»An.  D.  Phil.,  Art.  7. 

4Sp.  Eth.,  Prop.  29. 

*0.  of  Th.  G.  V.  7,  pp.  100-106;  D.  p.  101. 

«M.  §'§  31,  32,  33. 

70.  of  Th.  G.  V.  7,  pp.  100-106,  D.  p.  100 

*Leibnitz  does  not  seem  to  undertake  a  proof  of  this  principle.  When  pressed 
to  do  so  by  Clarke,  he  falls  back  upon  experience  pure  and  simple,  "from 
whence  one  may  reasonably  judge  that  it  will  succeed  in  unknown  cases  or  in 
such  cases  as  can  only  by  its  means  become  known;  according  to  the  method 
of  experimental  philosophy,  which  proceeds  a  posteriori;  though  the  principle 
were  not  perhaps  otherwise  justified  by  bare  reason,  or  a  priori.*'  Leibnitz's 
Fifth  Paper,  answer  to  Clarke's  Fourth  Reply,  §  129. 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    LEIBNITZ. 

"But  there  must  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  contingent  truths,  or  those  of 
fact,  that  is,  for  the  series  of  things  diffused  through  the  universe  of  created 
objects."1 

"And  thus  it  is  that  the  final  reason  of  things  must  be  found  in  a  neces- 
sary substance  .      .      .  and  this  it  is  what  we  call  God."2 

So  contingent  things  finally  lead  to  the  existence  of  a  necessary  being 
"since  contingent  beings  exist  which  can  only  have  their  final  or  sufficient  reason 
in  a  necessary  being  who  has  the  reason  of  his  existence  in  himself. "3  "Thus 
God  alone  in  the  primitive  unity  or  the  original  simple  substance."4  We  have 
found  a  fact  which  can  be  defined  as  a  being  whose  essence  is  existence. 

This  marks  the  end  of  the  first  stage.  "Why  there  is  something  rather 
than  nothing" — even  though  nothing  were  easier  than  something — has  been 
answered.     The  reason  for  the  whole  world  has  been  found. 

But  "Further,  suppose,  that  things  must  exist,  we  must  be  able  to  give  a 
reason  why  they  must  exist  so  and  not  otherwise."5  By  the  previous  deduction 
it  has  been  shown  how  being  in  general  is  necessary;  now  it  must  be  shown 
how  the  existence  of  each  individual  thing  is  involved  in  the  idea  of  Being  or 
God.  Nothing  less  will  satisfy  a  rigorous  rationalistic  system.  Or,  to  put  it 
in  the  words  of  our  thinker,  our  task  is  "to  explain  a  little  more  clearly  how, 
from  eternal  or  essem'al  or  mataphysical  truths,  temporary,  contingent,  or 
physical  truths  arise."6 

In  his  Uultimate  Origin  of  Things"  he  takes  up  this  development  in  de- 
tail. From  the  fact  "that  something  exists  rather  than  nothing,  there  is  in 
possible  things  ...  a  certain  need  of  existence,  and  so  to  speak,  some  claim 
to  existence,  in  a  word,  that  essence  tends  itself  toward  existence.  Whence  it 
further  follows  that  all  possible  things,  whether  expressing  essence  or  possible 
reality,  tend  by  equal  right  toward  existence,  according  to  their  quantity  of 
essence  of  reality,  or  according  to  the  degree  of  perfection  which  they  contain, 
for  perfection  is  nothing  else  than  degree  of  essence." 

"Hence  it  is  most  clearly  understood  that  amongst  the  infinite  combina- 
tions of  possibles  and  possible  series,  that  one  exists  by  which  the  most  of 
essence  or  of  possibility  is  brought  into  existence.  .  .  .  And  here  the  time, 
place,  or,  as  many  say,  the  receptivity  or  capacity  of  the  world  may  be  con- 
sidered. .  .  .  So  it  being  once  posited  that  being  is  better  than  not  being, 
or  that  there  is  a  reason  why  something  should  be  rather  than  nothing  . 
it  follows  that  even  in  the  absence  of  every  other  determination  the  quantity  of 
existence  is  as  great  as  possible,  regard  being  had  to  the  capacity  of  the  time 
and  of  the  place  (or  possible  order  of  existence)   .      .      ." 


*M.  §  36. 

21.  M.  §  38. 

«M.  §  45. 

«L  M.  §  47. 

&N.  and  G.  §  7. 

«0.  of  Th.  G.  V.  7,  pp.  100-106;  D.  p.  101. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

Perhaps  an  illustration  will  make  this  clearer.  Suppose  we  had  the 
problem  of  placing  upon  a  board  the  largest  number  of  disks  so  that  their  cen- 
ters would  be  equi-distant  from  one  another.  We  would  choose  to  arrange  them 
in  equilateral  triangles.  Having  once  chosen  to  place  as  many  as  possible  on  the 
board,  it  became  immediately  necessary  to  arrange  them  so. 

So  with  the  world  of  things.  The  Being  whose  essence  is  existence  wishes 
to  express  himself  in  the  fullest  existence.  The  most  perfect  world  will  be  the 
fullest  one.  "So  the  perfection  or  the  degree  of  essence  (through  which  the 
greatest  possible  number  is  at  the  same  time  possible)  is  the  principle  of 
existence."1 

If  then  we  could  define  the  most  perfect  world  we  could  state  exactly 
what  things  have  existed,  do  exist,  and  will  exist.    "The  present  is  big  with  the 
future,  the  future  could  be  read  in  the  past,  the  distant  expressed  in  the  neai 
One  could  become  acquainted  with  the  beauty  of  the  universe  in  each  soul,  if 
one  could  unfold  all  its  folds,  which  only  develop  physically  in  time."1 

Whatever  may  be  the  defects  of  Leibnitz's  attempts,  his  ideal  is  clear.  He 
wishes  to  make  rationalism  a  universal  method  of  knowledge.  There  streamed 
out  before  his  consciousness  a  perfect  system  of  reasoning  beginning  with  one 
idea,  involving  existence  and  containing  definitions  of  all  other  things  in  the 
world.  All  the  varied  general  notions  and  the  countless  stubborn  facts  found 
their  unity  in  this  primal  idea,  or  substance  called  God,  the  rationalist's  very 
present  help  in  time  of  trouble. 

His  contribution  lay  in  the  clearness  with  which  he  summed  up  his  problem 
in  the  two  kinds  of  propositions  or  truths,  those  of  fact  and  those  of  reason, 
and  the  remarkable  acumen  with  which  he  urged  the  logical  system  against 
the  empirical. 

This  very  clearness,  however,  but  brings  out  the  weakness  of  his  method. 
The  connection  between  his  primal  idea  and  general  notions  was  not  made 
exact,  and  he  never  pretended  it  was  made  complete.  His  "perfection"  com- 
pletely failed  to  explain  individual  things.  His  two  great  principles  were  never 
merged  into  one.* 

Still  his  efforts  were  admirable,  and  one  can  hardly  close  the  study  of 
his  works  without  longing  for  a  disciple  who  shall  rise  up  and  finish  the  task 
by  weaving  his  suggestive  but  broken  threads  into  a  rational  and  triumphant 
whole. 


iG.  V.  7,  pp  100-106.     D.  pp  101-103. 

In  Nature  and  Grace  (§§  9,  10)  the  perfection  of  God  is  the  sum  total  of 
positive  attributes.  Perfection,  in  the  sense  of  quantity  of  existence,  is  here 
used  as  more  closely  fitting  into  the  idea  of  God  as  ens  realissimum  used  in  the 
first  part  of  the  paper.  Either  would  illustrate  Leibnitz's  methods  of  meeting 
the   demand   of   Rationalism. 

*Leibnitz's  motive  for  strenuously  insisting  upon  "sufficient  reason"  be- 
comes clear  when  it  is  understood  that  it  includes  both  the  efficient  cause  and 
the  final  reason  or  end  of  things.  Such  a  reason  is  amenable  to  analysis,  while 
efficient  causes  are  discoverable  only  by  observation.  This  end,  perfection,  is 
in  God's  mind.  Such  perfection  does  not  in  any  way  indicate  the  order  of 
things  in  the  world.  A  may  be  moved  to  B's  place,  and  B  to  A's,  and  just  as 
much  reality  is  here  as  before.  The  attempt  to  define  an  individual  by  such  per- 
fection leaves  out  the  very  necessary  attribute  of  position. 

As  for  the  perfection  of  the  world,  it  appears  to  be  an  a  posteriori  assump- 
tion. From  the  things  in  the  world  a  perfect  being  is  argued,  an  ens  perfectis- 
simum  or  ens  realissimum,  and  from  such  a  being  a  perfect  world  is  argued. 
Perhaps  neither  one  exists.     For  motive  see  also  Paulsen,  pp  20,  21. 


SECTION  II. 

THE   RATIONALISM  OF  WOLFF. 

Introduction. 

In  contrast  with  Leibnitz,  none  of  the  difficulties  encountered  in  Wolff  are 
due  to  his  style  or  method  of  writing.  He  takes  time  to  reflect.  He  follows 
persistently  every  thought  to  its  branchings,  and  every  branch  to  its  ending.  He 
is  a  system  maker  by  temperament.  His  plan  is  magnificent  in  its  scope,  large 
and  sweeping  in  a  suggestiveness  which,  though  lacking  consistency  of  detail, 
yet  makes  a  strong  appeal  to  the  imagination. 

In  his  later  works  his  purpose  appears  to  be  nothing  less  than  making  all 
science  deductive.  Founding  his  method  in  his  Logic,  laying  down  his  first  prin- 
ciples in  his  Ontology,  he  proceeds  to  his  Cosmology,  Psychology,  Sociology, 
and  other  works  to  marshal  all  his  sciences  into  one  grand  rational  whole, 
admitting  empirical  knowledge  only  secondarily  and  temporarily. 

Superficially  considered  such  a  plan  seems  to  realize  the  conception  of 
Leibnitz  and  to  be  a  perfecting  of  his  vigorous  though  broken  utterances.  The 
student  finds  himself  again  in  the  familiar  domain  of  the  law  of  contradiction 
and  sufficient  reason,  of  necessity  and  contingency,  and  the  relation  of  these 
through  God  and  the  perfection  of  the  world. 

While  apparently  an  immense  and  permanent  movement  toward  the  ful- 
filment of  Leibnitzian  ideals  is  accomplished,  it  is  but  the  forward  motion  of 
breakers  on  an  ebbing  tide.  The  undertow  is  really  in  the  opposite  direction  and 
the  resultant  motion  backward.  To  carry  the  figure  still  further,  while 
Wolff's  system  presents  the  wave-like  regularity  of  the  ocean's  surface,  its 
thought-depths  are  stirred  with  currents  and  counter-currents,  eddies  and  un- 
dertows, seemingly  wholly  unsounded  and  uncharted  by  the  thinker  himself. 

With  reference  to  the  rationalistic  ideal,  three  general  movements  appear. 
First  there  is  the  early  attempt  to  reduce  Leibnitz's  two  principles  of  contra- 
diction and  sufficient  reason  to  one.  Failing  in  this,  Wolff  distinctly  retro- 
grades by  falling  back  upon  the  scholastic  method  of  including  existence  as  an 
attribute  in  the  definition  of  individual  things.  Finally,  he  moves  forward  to- 
ward empiricism  by  empirically  deriving  such  definitions.  All  of  these  move- 
ments tend  directly  to  the  decay  of  the  analytic  method;  the  first  by  failure 
to  deal  with  its  fundamental  problem ;  the  second,  by  taking  an  untenable  posi- 
tion on  this  problem;  the  third,  by  limiting  its  operations  to  syllogisms  whose 
premises  are  synthetic  propositions  a  posteriori. 


CHAPTER  I. 
Attempts  To  Reduce  the  Two  Principles  to  One. 

One  of  the  most  patent  deficiencies  of  Leibnitzian  rationalism  was  the  re- 
tention of  two  fundamental  principles — contradiction  and  sufficient  reason.  Not 
only  Wolff,  but  other  lesser  followers  of  Leibnitz,  appear  to  have  been  early 
struck  with  this  defect,  and  to  have  made  attempts  to  reduce  the  two  to  one. 
Until  that  was  accomplished,  knowledge  of  things  must  come  by  experience. 

In  his  earlier  Metaphysics  (as  he  sometimes  calls  it)  Wolff  notes  that 
Leibnitz  considered  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  "as  a  principle  grounded 
in  experience  against  which  no  one  could  give  a  contradictory  example."  The 
former  thinks,  "It  can  be  sufficiently  proven"  by  the  fact  that  "by  it  the  differ- 
ence between  truth  and  dreams,  between  the  true  world  and  the  world  of 
phantasms  arises."  As  truth  is  the  order  of  changes  in  this  world,  without  such 
a  principle  there  would  be  no  truth.1  But  such  an  argument  is  defective  in  that 
it  militates  against  the  order  of  this  world  only.  The  dream-world  has  an 
order,  also. 

A  more  decided  effort  in  the  same  direction  is  made  in  the  same  work  in 
the  following  manner.  If  two  things  are  identical,  one  can  be  put  in  the  place 
of  the  other.  Suppose,  then,  A  and  B  are  thus  identical.  If  the  law  of  sufficient 
reason  does  not  hold,  a  change  may  take  place  in  A  and  not  in  B,  and  A  may 
become  causelessly  A  -(-  C.  It  cannot  then  be  put  in  the  place  of  B,  which  is 
contrary  to  the  supposition  that  they  are  identical,  and,  therefore,  impossible, 
for  a  thing  cannot  both  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time.  Wolff  always,  as  here, 
states  the  law  of  contradiction  with  the  time  element  included  and  so  makes  it 
include  things  or  facts.  At  any  instant  a  thing  is  itself,  be  it  fact  or  idea.  The 
real  problem  is  to  give  facts  or  things  a  timeless  identity.2 

Evidently  Wolff  felt  the  weakness  of  this  second  attempt  to  connect  the  law 
of  sufficient  reason  with  that  of  contradiction,  for  in  his  Ontologia,  where  he 
takes  up  a  complete  discussion  of  the  two  principles,  it  is  not  mentioned, 
though  he  does  cling  to  the  former  one  concerning  the  dream-world.  In  fact,  in- 
stead of  continuing  his  efforts  toward  unifying  the  two  principles,  he  finally 
leaves  them  vaguely  co-ordinated  under  a  show  of  systematic  correlation.  "It 
appears,  therefore,"  he  says,  "that  the  principle  of  contradiction  is  the  source  of 
all  certitude.  If  it  is  posited,  certitude  in  human  knowledge  is  likewise  posited ; 
if  it  is  destroyed,  certitude  is  also  destroyed."  Then,  after  noting  that  many 
philosophers,  and  especially  Leibnitz,  have  made  prominent  use  of  the  principle 
of  sufficient  reason,  he  seemingly  elevates  it  to  co-ordinate  rank  with  his  pre- 
vious principle,  by  adding  "therefore  we  have  placed  it  in  the  number  of 
ontological  principles,  where  not  less  than  the  principle  of  contradiction,  we 
use  it  for  firmly  and  undeniably  establishing  the  foundations  of  knowledge." 
Further,  as  if  to  emphasize  its  importance,  he  makes  no  attempt  to  deduce  it 
from  any  prime  principle,  but  derives  it  from  experience.  It  is  not  contrary  to 
experience,  and  is  capable  of  being  extracted  from  singular  and  universal 
examples;  the  nature  of  our  mind  makes  it  difficult  to  admit  any  single  case 
without  a  sufficient  reason,  and  it  is  admitted  to  a  place  among  axioms  without 


*G.  §§  30,  142,  144,  572. 
2Ibid.  §§  31,  17,  10. 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    WOLFF 

proof.    The  outcome  seems  to  be  that  the  two  principles,  though  more  vaguely, 
are  really  left  as  far  asunder  as  with  Leibnitz.1 

From  the  viewpoint  of  perfected  rationalism,  failure  to  join  its  two  funda- 
mental principles  meant  final  failure  of  the  system.  Wolff's  inability  to  do 
this,  however,  merely  marked  a  halt  in  the  expected  evolution.  One  could  still 
hold  to  the  ideal  and  look  for  a  genius  of  reconcilation.  Such  a  pause  need  not 
necessitate  any  surrender  of  method. 
1 

iO.  §§  77,  55,  71-75. 


CHAPTER  II. 
Existence  is  Included  in  the  Definition  of  a  Thing. 

Having  thus  given  up  the  problem  of  reducing  the  two  principles  to  one,  or 
of  accounting  for  contingents  by  connecting  them  with  necessary  ideas,  Wolff 
attacks  the  problem  of  individual  existence  from  another  angle.  Apparently  all 
unconscious  of  any  historical  retrogression,  and  certainly  without  any  indication 
of  external  influences,  but  seemingly  moved  wholly  by  prima  facie  difficulties, 
he  falls  back  upon  the  scholastic  method  of  bridging  the  chasm  which  Leibnitz 
saw  so  clearly  to  be  the  fundamental  difficulty  of  historic  rationalism.  This 
method  was  the  easy  short-circuiting  of  the  whole  difficulty  by  defining  indi- 
viduals, instead  of  seeking  for  an  idea  of  a  necessary  substance  and  then  labor- 
iously analyzing  out  the  individual  existences  of  the  world  as  its  attributes. 

He  begins  his  task  of  defining  individuals  in  such  a  way  as  to  include  all 
their  attributes,  even  existence,  as  follows:  "If  simple  attributes  which  remain 
undetermined  in  the  notion  of  a  species  are  themselves  determined,  so  that  this 
determination  does  not  conflict  with  the  general  attribues  which  reside  in  the 
notion  of  the  species,  the  notion  of  an  individual  is  obtained.  This  is  true,  for 
a  species  contains  those  attributes  common  to  individuals  .  .  .  Therefore, 
if  these  attributes  are  determined  so  that  nothing  is  left  undertermined,  the 
notion  of  an  individual  is  obtained." 

"It  appears  then  that  an  individual  is  a  thing  determined  in  every  way,  or 
a  thing  in  which  all  attributes  are  determined  which  inhere  in  it."1  For  exam- 
ple, "if  in  arithmetic,  individual  numbers  related  to  certain  species  are  so  de- 
scribed that  the  manner  in  which  they  are  determined  from  given  things  becomes 
apparent,  the  notion  of  an  individual  is  illustrated  and  the  manner  in  which 
universal  knowledge  inheres  in  individuals  is  plain.  For  example,  the  analytic 
formula  for  the  number  of  angles  in  a  polygon  is  n2  plus  n  divided  by  2,  where 
n  denotes  the  number  of  sides."  If  in  a  particular  case  n  equals  5,  the  figure  could 
be  accurately  constructed,  and  "we  have  thus  a  definition  of  an  individual  of 
which  thus  far  we  have  been  content  with  a  clear  notion,  and  also  immediately 
the  principimn  individuationis  which  is  the  determination  in  every  way  of  those 
attributes  which  inhere  in  things."2 

The  Ontology  further  adds :  "Whatever  exists  or  actually  is,  is  determined 
in  every  way."  .  .  .  "A  singular  thing  or  individual  is  that  which  is  deter- 
mined in  every  way."  .  .  .  "Through  the  principium  individuationis  the  in- 
trinsic sufficient  reason  of  an  individual  is  known."3 

By  this  means  it  becomes  unnecessary  for  the  analyst  to  go  outside  of  the 
definition  to  find  the  attribute  existence  in  the  notion  of  a  thing. 


iL.  §§  73-74  and  note. 

2L.,  §§  72,  74  and  note,  cf.  §§  43,  75. 

30.,  §§  226-229;  cf.  §§  261-265. 


CHAPTER  III. 
§  1.    Deriviation  of  Wolff's  Data  of  Knowledge. 

In  spite  of  the  above  described  unsuccessful  attempts  to  explain  existence 
by  joining  the  two  principles  of  Leibnitz  and  by  the  expedient  of  individual 
definition,  Wolff  is  apparently  unsuspicious  of  any  defect  in  his  system.  He 
bravely  asserts  that  "the  rules  of  logic  are  sufficient  for  discerning  truth  from 
falsehood,"  for  "If  both  the  premises  of  any  syllogism  are  true  the  conclusion 
is  true."  The  conclusions  appear  in  the  form  of  propositions  "concluded  from 
syllogisms  agreeing  among  themselves  in  which  we  do  not  use  any  premises 
except  definition,  indubtiable  experience,  axioms  and  propositions  already 
demonstrated."     All  of  these  are  said  to  be  true  without  doubt.1 

From  the  citations  it  appears  clearly  that  Wolff's  whole  system  is  finally 
grounded  upon  "axioms,  definitions  and  indubitable  experiences."  Concerning 
these  two  questions  immediately  arise:  Do  any  or  all  of  them  include  existence 
of  things?  If  so,  how  did  existence  come  to  be  included?  Upon  the  answer 
to  these  questions  Wolff's  entire  rationalism  depends.  For  unless  each  one  of 
these  data  of  his  logic  can  be  logically  derived  from  some  necessary  primary 
idea,  his  scheme  has  failed.  To  determine  that  po'nt  one  datum  after  the  other 
will  be  taken  up  in  the  succeeding  chapters  and  traced  through  its  various 
stages  to  its  source. 

§  2.     Meaning  and  Genesis  of  Indubitable  Experiences. 

Beginning  with  indubitable  experiences,  we  will  try  to  make  their  mean- 
ing clear  by  definition  and  example.  From  his  earliest  works  to  his  later 
logic,  Wolff's  treatment  remains  practically  the  same.  In  Gendanken  v.  Gott 
he  says,  "The  knowledge  (Erkcnntniss)  which  we  gain  when  we  pay  attention 
to  our  sensations  and  soul-changes,  we  are  accustomed  to  call  experience."  As 
an  illustration  of  his  meaning  he  mentions  the  overcast  sky  and  the  lighting  of 
a  room  by  a  lamp.2  When  such  experiences  are  formulated  in  words,  they  form 
intuitive  judgments.  For  example,  in  the  above-mentioned  work  he  attempts 
to  prove  by  the  use  of  the  syllogism:  "He  who  is  conscious  of  his  own 
existence  and  that  of  other  things,  exists."  "We  are  conscious  of  our  own  ex- 
istence and  that  of  other  things."  "Therefore,  we  exist."  "In  this  syllogism 
.  the  minor  premise  is  an  indubitable  experience."3 

In  his  earlier  and  later  logics  also,  under  the  heading  of  demonstrations, 
he  gives  some  well-known  Euclidian  problems  after  the  manner  of  ordinary 
logic,  using  axioms,  definitions,  and  intuitive  judgments  which  identify  the 
last  with  indubitable  experiences.4 

The  definition  and  examples  of  intuitive  judgments  further  substantiate 
this  identification.  "We  call  that  judgment  intuitive  in  which  we  attribute  to 
a  certain  thing  what  we  immediately  perceive  is  contained  in  the  notion  of  it." 
"For  example,  'The  sun  shines'  is  an  intuitive  judgment."5 

*L.,  §§  545,  537,  544,  267,  262,  505,  538,  534. 

2G.,  §  325;  cf.  K.  ch.  5,  §  1. 

3G.,  §  36,  7;  cf.  K.  ch.  5,  §  1. 

The  same  syllogism  is  given  in  the  late  Psychlogia  Empirica,  §  16.  He 
calls  the  major  premise  an  indemonstrable  proposition,  (cf.  Log.  §  263). 
The  minor  is  an  intuitive  judgment,  arising  from  indubitable  experience. 

*K.,  ch.  4,  §  25;  L.,  §  551-553. 

5L.,  §  51. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

The  meaning  of  indubitable  experiences  or  intuitive  judgments  now  being 
clear,  the  next  task  is  to  describe  their  origin  and  method  of  formation. 

In  Part  II,  Section  2  of  the  Logic,  headed  "Formation  of  Intuitive  Judg- 
ments and  Notions  a  posteriori"  this  is  carefully  done.  "To  form  intuitive 
judgments  one  ought  to  attend  to  those  attributes  which  inhere  in  things,  or 
to  those  things  to  which  the  attributes  are  related  in  any  manner,  and  further, 
the  thing  which  one  perceives  comprehends  these  attributes  ought  to  be 
assumed  for  a  subject;  and  what  he  comprehends  in  the  thing  or  the  relations 
of  it  to  the  other  things,  which  he  observes,  for  a  predicate."  The  method  is 
illustrated  as  follows :  "For  this  reason  we  know  that  the  rays  of  the  sun  warm 
things,  the  rain  wets  things,  .  .  .  and  fire  burns.  And  if  these 
judgments  are  at  first  nothing  except  singulars,  we  will  show  how 
they  are  drawn  out  to  universals."1  If  from  observation  it  is 
established  that  the  predicate  of  an  intuitive  judgment  is  an  attribute  or  an 
essential  or  something  residing  in  the  mode  of  an  attribute  it  appears  to  be  a 
universal  intuitive  categorical  judgment."  "For  example,  exper  ence  demon- 
strates that  the  power  of  becoming  hot  and  of  cooling  is  among  the  attribute? 
of  stones.  The  propositions  therefore,  a  stone  can  become  hot;  a  stone  can  oe- 
come  cold,  are  universal  .  .  . "  "It  is  to  experience  that  we  owe  the  universal 
propositions,  Every  stone  can  become  hot.     Every  stone  can  become  cold,"'2 

"Similarly,  by  observation  alone  it  is  possible  to  establish  (§675)  that 
equality  of  sides  belongs  among  essentials  of  squares.  On  which  account  the 
proposition,  A  square  has  equal  sides,  is  universal.  And,  therefore,  from  exper- 
ience the  universal  proposition,  Every  square  has  equal  sides,  is  derived."  In 
the  same  manner,  hardness  of  stones  is  established.3 

From  these  references  it  will  appear  now  completely  empirical  are  thes? 
data  of  Wolff's  logic.  They  turn  out  to  be  the  simplest  observations  or  the 
most  patent  inductions.  With  indubitable  experiences  admitted  as  final  sources 
of  knowledge,  any  rationalistic  system  is  vitiated.  Whatever  structure  of 
magnificent  reasoning  may  be  built  upon  this  foundation,  it  will  always  be  as 
unstable  as  the  crude  opinions  of  common  sense,  for  they  both  rest  ultimately 
upon  the  same  basis.  Yet  this  admission,  important  as  it  is,  becomes  minor  in 
the  light  of  further  study.     The  one  admission  of  experience  here  is  merely 

"the  little  rift  within  the  lute, 
Which  by  and  by  will  make  the  music  mute, 
And  ever  widening  slowly  silence  all." 
Not  only  indubitable  experiences  come  from  observation,  but  such  impregnable 
strongholds  of  rationalism  as  ideas,  definitions,  propositions,  and  even  princi- 
ples themselves,  as  will  be  seen,  are  drawn  most  naively  from  the  very  fountain 
heads  of  empiricism.    They  are  magnificent  examples  of  induction. 

§3.     Formation  of  Definitions,  Nominal  and  Real. 

While  in  general,  historic  rationalism  did  not  demand  a  practical  difference 
between  ideas  and  definitions,  Wolff  does  make  a  verbal  distinction.  "We  dis- 
tinguish a  complete  and  determinate  notion  from  a  definition  as  a  sign  is 
distinguished  from  the  thing  signified,  a  notion  from  its  term,  an  enunciation 
from  its  judgment."4  The  method  of  foiming  nominal  definitions  is  first  de- 
scribed.    In  general,  predicates  which  are  not  determined  by  each  other,  and 


1  L.,  §  669  and  note. 

2L.,  §  705,  Note  708. 

»L.,  §  705;  K.,  ch.  3;  5-11;  ch.  5,  §  1;  G.,  §  329-330;  272. 

4L.,  §  152  and  note. 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    WOLFF      fuN|VERSlTV 

which  when  selected  and  brought  together,  serve  to  distinguish  the  subjecf 
from  other  things,  are  combined  in  one  proposition.  The  process  is  made  elear 
by  an  example.  "If  anyone  studies  an  equilateral  triangle,  he  understands 
that  equality  of  sides  and  of  angles  is  predicated  of  it.  But  when,  through 
demonstrations,  it  appears  that  equality  of  angles  is  determined  by  equality  of 
sides,  so  that  inequality  of  sides  and  of  angles  is  contradictory,  then  equality 
of  angles  can  be  excluded  from  the  definitions."1 

The  method  of  forming  real  definitions  from  nominal  was  described  in 
substance  in  his  early  work  on  Human  Judgment,  sometimes  called  Logic.  In 
his  later  Logic  he  gives  the  same  genesis:  "If  from  a  given  nominal  definition 
a  real  definition  is  sought  (1)  as  many  intuitive  judgments  should  be  formed 
as  possible.  .  .  .  And  if  then  it  does  not  appear  what  ought  to  be  done  to 
derive  the  thing  defined  (2)  conclusions  should  be  drawn  .  .  .  until  it  can 
be  found  what  ought  to  be  done  that  the  thing  may  be  derived.  .  .  .In 
memory  we  can  reflect  upon  things  before  seen,  for  among  these  may  occur 
those  things  by  which  the  things  required  for  the  genesis  of  the  thing  defined 
may  be  found.  And  if  such  things  occur,  the  genesis  of  the  thing  can  be 
conceived.   .      .      ." 

For  example,  "If  there  is  stated  a  nominal  definition  of  vapor  as  fine 
particles  of  water  which  ascend  into  the  air  as  if  spontaneously,  then,  by 
investigating  the  manner  by  which  vapors  are  formed,  we  form  the  first  intui- 
tive judgment,  Vapors  ascend  in  the  air  as  if  spontaneously.  Then,  if  it  occurs 
to  us  that  every  fluid  body  ascending  apparently  spontaneously,  is  lighter  than 
the  medium  in  which  it  ascends,  thence  we  infer  that  vapor  is  lighter  than  air. 
From  the  nominal  definition  we  obtain  another  intuitive  judgment:  Vapors  are 
particles  of  water.  It  is  recorded  that  water  is  heavier  than  air.  Hence  we 
gather  that  vapors  consist  of  materials  heavier  than  air."  Then  by  the  same 
process  of  memory,  comparison,  and  definition,  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
"water  is  resolved  into  bubbles  by  rarefaction  of  air  through  heat,"  and  thus 
we  arrive  at  the  real  definition.  A  shorter  example  of  the  same  method  is 
drawing  a  parabola.  In  the  early  Logic,  he  uses  tlu  same  example,  and  re- 
marks, "Much  help  comes  from  blind  luck."2 

This  fully  covers  the  case  of  definitions,  and  even  more,  for  "since  from 
nominal  definitions  genetic  definitions  themselves  are  derived  and  fiom  a  genetic- 
definition,  which  shows  distinctly  the  genesis  of  a  thing,  all  attributes  which 
belong  or  can  belong  to  a  thing  are  deduced;  therefore,  without  doubt  from  a 
nominal  definition  all  attributes  can  be  deduced  which  belong  to  a  thing."3 

Definitions,  however,  may  be  considered  as  composites  made  up  of  terms  or 
ideas.  The  ideas,  to  make  the  exposition  of  Wolff's  system  complete,  must  be 
traced  to  their  origin. 

§  4.    Origin  of  Ideas. 
The  later  Logic  is  the  first  Latin  work  of  Wolff's  later  career.    In  it  ideas 
are  given  a  fully  detailed  account.    We  begin  by  perceiving  external  things  by 

means  of  the  senses;  or  we  bring  them  to  mind  by  imagination  and  can  pay 
attention  to  this  simple  representation  in  the  mind  called  "a  notion  by  some, 
by  others  an  idea."4    This  process  gives  particular  notions  of  things.    "Univer- 


iL.,  §  730,  note. 

2L.,  §  734,  note;  K.,  ch.  I,  §  35-56;  52. 

30.,  §  265. 

*L.,  §§  30,  34. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

sal  notions  are  notions  of  likenesses  among  many  things,  or  better,  notions  by 
which  attributes  common  to  many  things  are  represented."  "Thus  it  is  that 
"universal  knowledge  comes  from  a  contemplation  of  single  things."1 

In  a  section  of  the  same  work  headed  "Concerning  the  Formation  of 
Intuitive  Judgments  and  Notions  a  posteriori"  one  paragraph  is  marked:  "In 
what  manner  a  universal  notion  is  acquired  by  means  of  the  senses,"  and  the 
following  example  is  given:  "Some  ordinary  figure,  say  a  regular  hexagon,  is 
placed  before  our  eyes.  If  those  things  which  are  represented  in  this  figure  are 
observed,  sides  and  angles  will  be  distinguished.  If  the  sides  are  numbered,  the 
number  is  apprehended  as  six.  If  they  are  compared  with  each  other,  they  are 
perceived  as  equal.  Therefore,  the  first  intuitive  judgment  is  formed:  A  regular 
hexagon  has  six  equal  sides.  In  the  same  way  the  second  intuitive  judgment 
is  formed:  A  regular  hexagon  has  six  equal  angles.  Suppose  the  surface  is 
red.  Therefore,  the  third  intuitive  judgment  will  be :  This  regular  hexagon  has 
its  surface  colored  red.  But  if  these  judgments  are  compared  with  one  another, 
it  easily  appears  that  while  the  number  six  and  the  equality  of  the  sides  and 
angles  are  constant,  the  color  of  the  surface  may  vary,  and  consequently  should 
not  be  included  in  the  notion,  but  excluded  as  something  foreign."  "Retaining 
the  number  six  and  the  equality  of  the  sides  and  angles,  you  produce  the  notion 
that  a  rgular  hexagon  is  a  figure  bounded  by  six  equal  right  lines  and  having 
all  angles  equal."2 

Several  succeeding  paragraphs  show  analogous  developments,  such  as  the 
manner  of  forming  distinct  notions  with  microscopes  and  telescopes;  in  the 
former  case  "by  the  use  of  microscopes,  we  obtain  distinct  notions  of  things 
which,  on  account  of  their  smallness,  by  the  naked  eye  alone  we  would  have 
confused  notions  only,  or  could  not  see  at  all."3 

To  make  it  clear  that  universal  knowledge  comes  from  these  processes  he 
refers  back  to  these  paragraphs,  saying,  "Though  experience  deals  only  with 
singulars  from  these  .  .  .  experience  serves  as  a  means  of  arriving  at 
universal  notions  distinct  and  adequate  and  in  like  manner,  to  definitions  them- 
selves, and  also  to  universal  hypothetical  and  categorical  propositions."4 

Then,  finally  summing  up  the  matter,  "As  notions  of  things  are  formed  by 
the  use  of  intuitive  judgments  concerning  things  perceived  by  the  sense  and 
general  notions  from  particular  notions,"  as  in  §§  710-715,  "by  the  following 
different  modes  universal  notions  are  formed: 

(a)  By  reflection  upon  those  things  which  are  perceived;  (b)  By  abstract- 
ing from  common  attributes  found  in  many  notions;  (c)  By  changing  variable 
determinations  into  others.  The  mode  of  forming  notions  is  threefold:  reflec- 
tion, abstraction  and  arbitrary  determination,  which  is  again  a  twofold  mode; 
(a)  By  determining  those  things  not  determined  in  a  certain  notion;  (b)  By 
determining  otherwise  what  is  already  determined.4 

The  deriviation  of  universal  notions  in  the  Rational  Psychology  is  made  even 
more  emphatically  empirical.  "Notions  of  genera  and  species  we  do  not  have, 
except  as  far  as  we  perceive  them  in  individuals  and  singulars  and  of  which  we 
are  conscious."    "Genera  and  species  do  not  exist  except  in  individuals."    "We 


iL.,  §§  54,  57. 

2L.,  §  678,  note;  cf.  also  K.  ch.  1,  §§  4-6;  19-20;  25,  26,  30;  G.,  273,  275. 

3L.,  §§  684,  685. 

4L.,  §  708. 

4L.,  §  716. 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    WOLFF 

do  not  have  any  universal  notions  except  as  we  abstract  from  individual  things 
perceived  by  the  senses,  or  as  we  bring  together  in  one  notion  the  attributes 
perceived  in  many  things  .  .  .  "It  appears,  therefore,  that  nothing  is  con- 
tained in  universal  notions  except  what  has  already  been  perceived  by  the  senses 
and  of  which  we  have  been  conscious,  or  which  we  have  apperceived.  . 
Universal  notions  are  apparent  to  the  intellect.  If  in  this  sense  the  common  ex- 
pression is  understood,  'Nothing  is  in  the  intellect  which  has  not  been  in  the 
senses/  in  this  sense  it  must  be  admitted  true.  Nevertheless,  whoever  infers 
from  these  things  which  we  suggest,  that  all  ideas  and  dependent  universal  no- 
tions are  brought  from  the  senses  into  the  mind  as  into  an  empty  receptacle, 
infers  things  which  by  no  means  follows."1 

Again  the  pursuit  of  Wolff's  data  leads  to  empiricism.  His  explanation 
of  ideas  and  definitions  is  not  accidental,  nor  is  it  limited  to  an  early  and 
unreflecting  period  of  his  career.  In  his  earliest  and  latest  works,  practically 
the  same  source  and  method  are  alleged.  In  fact,  the  late  Psychologia  empha- 
sizes with  more  force  than  any  other  work  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  gen- 
eral notions  except  through  individuals,  and  asserts  positively  that  they  arise 
by  way  of  the  senses  alone. 

Wolff's  saving  clause  concerning  too  general  inferences  about  the 
mind  as  an  "empty  receptacle" — thrown  out  to  save  the  face  of  rationalism — 
will  not  retrieve  the  position  surrendered.  Rationalism,  based  upon  experience, 
definitions  and  ideas  like  those  already  examined,  has  claim  to  neither  certainty 
nor  universality.  Possibly  axioms  will  possess  these  requisites  to  the  proper 
degree. 

§  5.     CERTAINTY  OF  AXIOMS. 

The  last  class  of  Wolff's  data  remains  to  be  examined.  Upon  them  rests 
the  integrity  of  his  deductive  scheme;  upon  them  devolves  the  office  of  saving 
its  universality  and  certainty.  These  are  the  axioms.  The  certainty  of  thes:? 
our  philosopher  has  guarded  by  testing  the  ideas  forming  them.  No  "deceptive 
notions"  must  creep  into  them.  Deceptive  notions  are  those  which  appear  to 
be  possible  but  are  really  contradictory.2  The  test  of  these  eventually  brings 
up  Wolff's  whole  method  of  insuring  certainty  and  truth. 

A  rigorous  rational  ideal  demanded  a  long  analysis  to  test  possibility  and 
hence  certainty.  With  Wolff  it  was  different.  Observation  was  as  final  as 
logic.     The  senses  were  co-ordinated  with  reason. 

In  the  following  paragraph  he  gives  an  "a  posteriori  test  of  possibility." 
"What  things  we  observe  in  one  and  the  same  subject,  these  things  are  not 
mutually  repugnant."3 

Again  he  says  that  "ideas  are  certain  if  we  can  discover  their  possibility," 
and  "since  experience  shows  us  that  the  things  exist  from  which  it  also  gives 
us  the  ideas,  so  we  also  discover  that  ideas  are  possible."  "We  have  two  ways, 
therefore,  by  which  we  attain  to  a  knowledge  of  the  truth.  One  grounds  itself 
in  the  senses,  the  other  in  the  reason.  So  "we  use  in  discovering  the  truth 
.  .  .  either  the  senses  alone,  or  by  reasoning  from  other  things  known  we 
gain  knowledge  not  before  possessed.  In  the  former  case  we  say  the  truth  is 
discovered  a  posteriori,  in  the  latter  a  priori."  "So  that  in  Philosophy  princi- 
ples must  be  derived  from  experience  which  are  demonstrated  by  experiments 
and  confirmed  by  observation.     .     .     ."4 


iP.R.,  §§  427-429  and  note. 

2L.,  §  135. 

3L.,  §  535;  O.,  §  47;  M.,  §15  K.  Ch.  I. 

4G.,  §  372;  L.,  §  663;  Intro.,  §  34;  O.,  §  47. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

From  these  quotations  selected  from  a  multitude  of  the  same  tenor,  it  is 
once  more  seen  how  the  empirical  element  is  decisive  and  enters  into  even  the 
final  test  for  certainty  with  the  so-called  master  systematizer  of  rationalism.  Cer- 
tainty depends  upon  the  traditional  contradiction  of  subject  and  predicate,  but  the 
contradiction  itself  is  discernable  either  by  analysis  or  by  observation,  by  rea- 
son or  by  the  senses,  and  these  two  are  co-ordinated  and  equally  final. 

Wolff's  premises  have  now  been  analyzed  one  by  one  and  all  end  finally  in 
sources  admittedly  empirical.  In  his  own  mind  he  may  still  have  held  to  the 
belief  that  theoretically,  at  least,  all  his  ideas,  definitions  and  axioms  might  be 
deduced  from  one  primary  idea,  but  actually  he  certainly  gave  no  single  illus- 
tration of  the  method  or  the  manner. 

As  a  whole  his  system  is  incomplete.  The  two  principles  of  Leibnitz  are 
as  far  asunder  as  ever;  indubtable  experience  turns  out  to  be  simple  observa- 
tion; ideas  are  made  up  of  observed  attributes  of  things;  definitions  are  sim- 
ilarly derived  and  are  ultimately  dependent  upon  the  senses  for  a  test  of  their 
certainty. 

Yet  on  the  surface  all  is  fair.  Reason  promises  to  accomplish  all  things. 
All  sciences  appear  to  be  rationalized.  Even  details  of  the  most  practical  na- 
ture can  be  settled  by  the  academic  thinker.  In  architecture,  for  example, 
through  the  concept  "utility,"  he  can  a  priori  guage  the  width  of  a  window,  for 
should  it  not  be  wide  enough  for  two  to  look  out  at  once?1  With  this  so  dis- 
tinctively Wolffian  bit  of  logic  we  turn  to  his  great  diciple  Kant. 


iBaukunst,  §  I. 


SECTION  III. 

THE   RATIONALISM  OF  KANT. 

Introduction. 

Kant's  whole  precritical  activity  may  be  viewed  as  a  search  for  Wolff's 
data  and  the  reduction  of  these  to  the  lowest  terms  possible.  The  Delucidatio 
begins  with  a  "new"  explanation  of  the  primary  principles  of  metaphysics. 
The  New  Idea  of  Motion  and  Rest  proceeds  by  the  empirical  method  to  obtain 
the  idea  of  motion.  The  False  Subtlety  arrives  at  many  immediately  perceived 
judgments  as  ultimates  in  experience.  The  Only  Possible  Proof  for  the  Exist- 
ence of  God,  as  its  subject  indicates,  seeks  an  improved  method  for  logically 
demonstrating  the  existence  of  God,  the  archetypal  idea  of  rationalism.  The 
attempt  of  the  Negative  Quantities  to  ground  the  law  of  sufficient  reason,  one 
of  Wolff's  co-ordinate  principles,  reveals  the  ancient  central  difficulty  of  the 
system  and  leaves  even  the  master  mind  of  Kant  halting  and  confused.  The 
Examination  of  the  Clearness  of  Moral  and  Religious  Principles  clears  up  the 
confusion  to  the  extent  of  differentiating  the  sources  of  mathematical  and  philo- 
sophical ideas,  the  former  being  made  and  the  latter  being  given.  Finally,  still 
in  quest  of  the  data  of  logic,  the  Dreams  of  the  Ghost-Seer  brings  the  long 
search  for  the  springs  of  ideas  not  to  a  single  source,  nor  to  reason  alone,  but 
to  several  possible  sources  in  experience.  At  last  the  Dissertation  of  '70  fixes 
the  genesis  of  human  experience  in  the  a  priori  forms  of  sensibility  and  cate- 
gories of  judgment,  and  bases  the  modified  rationalistic  system  upon  a  founda- 
tion impossible  to  overthrow  because  completely  inaccessible. 

Through  it  all,  too,  runs  the  thread  of  increasing  empirical  data  until  it  is 
lost  in  the  unknowability  of  the  thing  in  itself.  Intuition  of  objects,  admitted 
by  Leibnitz  as  merely  incidental  to  rationalism,  co-ordinated  by  Wolff  with 
reason  as  a  source  and  test  of  truth;  accepted  originally  by  Kant  in  the  unim- 
portant Leibnitzian  sense,  rises  gradually  in  the  precritical  writings  to  larger 
and  larger  proportions  until  it  destroys  both  the  universality  and  the  certainty 
of  the  deductive  method. 


CHAPTER  I. 
Kant  as  a  Wolffian  Rationalist. 

The  original  position  of  Kant  with  reference  to  epistemology  has  been 
called  Wolffian.  That  means,  first  of  all,  that  he  was  a  rationalist.  He  accepts 
without  question  the  dogmatic  assumption  that  pure  reason  can  know  all.  This 
was  the  popularly  accepted  position  of  Wolff,  although,  from  the  first,  eclecticism 
was  recognized  as  a  minor  element  in  the  great  systematizer's  structure.  In 
the  literary  form  of  his  early  treatises,  in  his  approach  of  the  problem,  in  sub- 
ject matter  and  in  the  method  of  solving  his  problem  by  temporizing  with 
experience,  Kant  was  following  Wolff's  system  as  it  was  popularly  accepted. 

The  form  of  his  first  metaphysical  treatise, — Principiorum  primorum  cog- 
nitionis  metapysicae  nova  delucidatio,  1755, — is  a  splendid  illustration  of  his 
close  alliance  with  the  school.  His  propositions  are  precisely  laid  down,  his 
ideas  are  distinctly  defined,  his  conclusions  and  corollaries  are  drawn  and  his 
scholia  added  with  the  exactness  of  the  mathematical  model  handed  down  from 
his  forefathers  in  the  faith, — Spinoza,  who  deemed  it  incumbent  to  cast  his 
thoughts  in  the  straightest  mathematical  forms;  Descartes,  who  invented  analyt- 
ical geometry;  Leibnitz,  a  co-originator  of  differential  calculus;  and,  finally, 
Wolff,  Kant's  immediate  forerunner,  the  formulator  and  popularizer  of  ration- 
alism in  Germany. 

While  the  general  form  of  the  treatise  immediately  attests  its  relationship 
to  rationalism  as  a  whole,  a  closer  examination  reveals  its  standpoint  to  be 
essentially  and  characteristically  Wolffian.  The  very  subject  of  the  treatise 
indicates  Kant's  point  of  attack.  It  professes  to  be  a  new  examination  of  the 
prime  principles  of  metaphysical  knowledge.  It  was  in  these  principles  or  pre- 
mises of  syllogisms  that,  it  will  be  remembered,  Wolff  was  so  completely  empiri- 
cal and  unsatisfactory. 

The  first  question  concerned  their  number.  Wolff  had  left  the  discussion 
between  one,  or  two,  or  more  principles  in  vague  suspense.  Kant  takes  up  this 
problem  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  treatise,  "De  principio  contradictionis"  is 
the  title  of  his  first  section.  "No  one  principle  of  all  truths  absolutely  unique, 
primary  and  universal  is  given,"  but  what  appears  to  be  such  a  principle,  viz., 
the  principle  of  contradiction  really  has  a  twofold  expression,  "quidquid  est,  est/' 
and  "quidquid  non  est,  non  est"  (Propositions  I  and  II).  This  division  he  feels 
is  necessary;  otherwise,  if  negative  propositions  are  to  be  indirectly  deduced 
from  affirmative  principles,  then  another  principle  is  tacitly  assumed,  viz., 
"Cujuscunque  oppositum  est  falsum,  illud  est  verum."     (Prop.  I). 

This  incipient  duality  grows  to  confusion  in  Section  II  of  the  "principio 
rationis  determinantis,  vulgo  sufficientis,"  as  he  elects  to  call  it  with  Crusius, 
and  in  improvement  upon  Wolff.  Here  he  defines  "determination"  in  the  sentence, 
"that  which  determines  a  subject  in  respect  to  its  perdicate  is  called  ratio." 
Ratio  is  immediately  distinguished  as  antecedenter  and  consequenter  (Prop.  IV), 
and  later  the  former  is  spoken  of  as  "mavis  geneticum  aut  saltern  identicam" 
(Prop.  V,  Schol.).  The  relation  of  these  various  principles  never  does  become 
entirely  clear,  and  the  reader  is  left  in  the  same  state  of  doubt  as  after  Wolff's 
attempted  reductions  of  all  principles  to  one.  It  is  true  that  Kant  makes  one 
or  two  brief  and  half-hearted  attempts  to  reduce  everything  to  the  principle 
of  contradiction,  but  his  efforts  are  neither  clear  nor  well  elaborated. 

His  whole  treatment  is  provisional  and  inconclusive.  Ks  Paulsen  well  says : 
"The  position  taken  herein  is  one  in  which  he  could  not  remain.  As  soon  as 
he  earnestly  turned  his  attention  to  epistemology,  he  was  compelled  to  a  new 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    KANT 

examination  of  the  problem  of  the  identity  or  the  non-identity  of  the  principle 
of  contradiction  and  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason."1 

The  obscurity  surrounding  Kant's  real  epistemological  system,  as  outlined 
in  the  Delucidatio,  with  reference  to  his  principles,  is  a  duplicate  of  Wolff's. 
In  both  instances  it  is  patent  enough  that  superficially  the  well-known  ration- 
alistic procedure  is  followed,  in  which  all  truths  are  reduced  to  one  fundamental 
proposition  and  finally  to  one  fundamental  idea,  viz.,  God.  But  just  underneath 
the  surface  one  continually  catches  disquieting  glimpses  of  an  altogether  differ- 
ent situation.  Instead  of  one  God,  there  may  be  many  gods;  instead  of  one 
principle,  many  principles.  Paulsen  notes  this  possibility  by  saying,  "If  other 
and  merely  incidental  statements  are  combined,  another  point  of  view  may  be 
arrived  at,  in  which  not  from  one  nor  from  even  a  few  fundamental  ideas  are 
all  others  in  the  system  derived,  but  rather  from  as  many  as  one  is  inclined  to 
originate.2 

The  same  motives  are  present  with  both  rationalists.  The  situation  arises 
from  the  overt  assumption  of  the  possibility  of  the  rationalistic  'deal  that  reason 
can  know  all,  and  the  partial  construction  of  such  a  system  with  the  tacit  admis- 
sion of  empirical  elements  until  such  a  time  as  skill  in  reasoning  shall  render 
them  unnecessary.  In  the  meantime  the  empirical  modicum  swells  to  the  place 
and  importance  of  a  fundamental  and  indispensable  part  of  the  system. 

An  example  of  the  incidental  use  is  found  in  Kant's  illustration  of  our 
knowledge  of  evil  in  the  world,  where  he  remarks  that  the  "ratio  Quod  seu 
cognoscendi"  does  not  require  demonstration,  "for  it  is  fully  revealed  in  experi- 
ence" (Prop.  IV).  This  is  an  example  of  "Adstiuctio  realitatis  definitionis," 
and  is  a  perfect  imitation  of  Wolff's  method  in  like  constructions. 

The  same  empiricism  lies  even  more  deeply  imbedded  in  this  essay,  and  con- 
cerns itself  with  the  very  genesis  of  one  of  the  chief  principles  herein  considered. 
In  the  deriviation  of  the  ratio  consequenter  determinatis  Kant  says:  "The  knowl- 
edge of  the  reason  of  a  truth  is  derived  intuitively,  or,  it  is  uniformly  accepted 
by  universal  consent  (Prop.  V,  Schol.).  Of  this  principle  Paulsen  says  it  is 
"nothing  else  than  the  mere  perception,  exverientia"  (Wahrenhmung)3  Kant's 
complete  absorption  in  Wolffianism  is  indicated  by  his  entire  lack  of  any  sus- 
picion as  to  the  meaning  for  rationalism  of  such  an  admission. 

That  such  dependence  upon  empirical  sources  in  the  very  beginning  of 
Kant's  speculative  career  is  not  accidental  is  further  substantiated  by  sentences 
in  the  "Praenotanda"  of  his  next  epistemological  work  in  the  following  year. 
(Metaphysicae  cum  geometria  junctae  usus  in  philosophia  naturali  cuius  spec- 
imen I  continet  monadologiam  physicam,  1756).  Here  he  advises  investigators  of 
nature  to  have  great  care  "in  order  that  something  might  not  be  vainly  essayed 
without  the  suffrage  of  experience  or  without  a  geometrical  interpretation,"  and 
further  states  that  nothing  could  be  more  salutory  to  philosophy  than  to  admit 
"nothing  except  those  things  which  are  known  only  by  the  immediate  testimony  of 
experience."  That  this  immediate  experience  is  not  the  Cartesian  internal  ex- 
perience is  shown  by  the  sentence  following  that,  "By  this  safe  method  we  could 
perfectly  expound  the  laws  of  nature." 

Here,  in  the  very  beginning  of  Kant's  career,  far  previous  to  the  suspicion 
of  any  possible  external  empirical  influences,  he  is  already  engaged  upon  the 
problem  of  the  reason  and  the  senses.  To  the  investigation  he  is  led  by  thinkers 
in  his  own  country.    Seizing  upon  the  patent  incompletion  of  the  Wolffian  sys- 

iR,  p.  35. 
2R,  p.  31. 
3P.,  p.  32. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

tern  he  endeavors  to  deal  with  the  principle  of  contradiction  and  sufficient  rea- 
son, builds  up  his  ens  necessarium,  covers  up  his  empiricism  with  a  great  show 
of  systematization,  derives  a  couple  of  secondary  principles  and  finally  wanders 
off  into  perfectly  Wolffian,  but  more  or  less  inane  practical  applications  under 
the  dignified  title  of  "Usus."  At  this  stage  Kant  is  Wolffian  with  a  venge- 
ance,— in  form,  in  matter,  in  motives,  in  nomenclature,  in  limitation  of  vision,  in 
superficiality,  in  admission  of  empirical  elements  and  in  suave  dogmatism  which 
assumes  the  complete  possibility  of  obtaining  all  knowledge  through  reason  alone 
without  any  examination  whatever  of  that  possibility. 


CHAPTER  II. 
A  Search  for  the  Premises  of  Logic. 

It  will  be  kept  in  mind  that  Wolff  left  the  origin  of  his  premises  in  a  most 
unsatisfactory  state.  In  his  Logica  he  says,  "The  rules  of  logic  are  sufficient 
for  discerning  truth  by  reason  along.  For  if  both  the  premises  of  any  syllogism 
are  true,  the  conclusion  is  true;  and  the  premises  are  true  if  the  propositions 
forming  them  can  be  demonstrated.  A  proposition  which  is  demonstrated  is 
concluded  from  syllogisms  agreeing  among  themselves,  in  which  we  do  not  use 
any  premises  except  definitions,  indubitable  experiences,  axioms  and  propositions 
previously  demonstrated."1  In  his  first  epistemological  works  the  empirical 
standpoint  of  Wolff  was  accepted  by  Kant  without  further  question.  However, 
as  already  noted  by  Paulsen,  he  could  not  long  remain  in  that  position.  In  his 
metaphysical  work,  Die  falsche  Spitzfindigkeit,  he  has  found  the  break  in  Wolff's 
rationalism  and  is  very  seriously  engaged  in  the  examination  of  the  origin  of 
his  premises.  The  connection  is  revealed  in  his  concluding  remarks,  though  the 
subject  of  this  work  calls  attention  to  its  incidental  character  as  an  announce- 
ment of  his  lecture  course.2  His  criticism  of  the  three  syllogistic  figures  and 
the  reduction  of  the  four  to  one  is  also  incidental.  His  real  criticism  of  logic 
is  contained  in  the  first  of  his  concluding  remarks  (§  6),  where  he  says,  "From 
this  appears  the  essential  fault  of  logic  as  it  has  been  commonly  treated,  viz., 
that  it  treated  of  clear  and  adequate  (vollstandigen)  ideas  before  judgments 
and  conclusions  of  reason,  although  the  former  are  possible  only  through  the 
latter."  His  problem,  therefore,  is  the  origin  of  the  data  of  logic.  He  is  taking 
up  the  task  exactly  where  Wolff  left  it.  Granting  that  logic  is  sufficient  for 
deriving  truth  from  given  premises,  the  great  question  remains:  Whence  come 
these  premises?  In  this  treatise,  Kant's  first  and  last  concern  is  with  these 
propositions.  At  the  beginning  he  says,  "To  join  a  mark  with  a  thing  is  called 
judging.  The  thing  itself  is  the  subject  and  the  mark  is  the  predicate."  Then 
he  distinguishes  the  two  kinds  of  judgments,  the  mediate  based  upon  the  fact 
that  "Whatever  is  a  mark  of  a  mark  of  a  thing,  that  is  called  a  mediate  mark 
of  the  thing  (§  1)."  Therefore,  "every  judgment  made  through  a  mediate 
mark  is  a  conclusion  of  reason  (§  1)."  Further,  from  this  appear  the  "most  gen- 
eral rules  of  all  conclusions  of  reason,"  in  the  positive  form,  "Nota  notae  est 
etiam  nota  rei  ipsius"  (a  mark  of  a  mark  is  a  mark  of  the  thing  itself) ;  in  the  neg- 
ative form,  "Repugnans  notae  repugnat  rei  ipsi"  (what  contradicts  the  mark  of 
a  thing. contradicts  the  thing  itself).  "None  of  these  rules  is  susceptible  to 
further  proof.  For  proof  is  possible  only  through  one  or  more  conclusions  of 
reason.  To  prove  the  most  general  formula  of  all  conclusions  of  reason  would 
be  called  reasoning  in  a  circle"  (§  2). 

On  the  other  hand,  "it  is  well  known  to  everyone  that  there  are  immediate 
conclusions  in  which  the  truth  of  one  judgment  will  lead  immediately  to  an- 
other judgment  without  a  mediative  idea.  On  this  account  such  conclusions  are 
not  conclusions  of  reason"  (§3). 

Interesting  as  such  an  advance  might  be  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  lec- 
ture announcement,  to  Kant's  own  thinking  it  is  quite  secondary,  as  shown  by 


iL.,  §  544. 

2The  order  of  the  precritical  writings  is  followed  as  given  in  Kant's  Gesam- 
melte  Schriften,  herausgegeben  von  der  Koniglich-Preussischen  Akademie  der 
Wissenschaften,  Band  II,  1905. 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

his  statement  that  such  a  change  merely  advances  toward  simplicity  and  that 
he  does  not  hope  very  much  from  it  (§  5). 

The  important  question  for  him  is  really  contained  in  his  concluding  re- 
marks concerning  the  origin  of  the  data  of  syllogisms  (§  6).  In  this  paragraph 
he  says  that  "a  clear  idea  is  possible  only  through  a  judgment;  an  adequate  idea 
through  a  conclusion  of  reason.  ...  In  this  connection  it  is  to  be  noted 
that  this  judgment  is  not  the  distinct  idea  itself,  but  the  process  through  which 
it  becomes  real;  for  the  perception  which  arises  from  a  consideration  of  the 
object  itself  is  distinct.  .  .  .  On  this  account,  one  can  call  a  distant  idea 
one  that  becomes  clear  through  a  judgment,  but  an  adequate  idea  is  one  that 
becomes  clear  through  a  conclusion  of  reason"  (§  6). 

The  origin  of  clear  and  adequate  ideas  now  having  been  satisfactorily 
explained,  the  next  thought  naturally  turns  to  the  origin  of  judgment.  For 
the  rationalistic  ideal  demanded  one  fundamental  proposition  from  which  all 
others  could  be  logically  deduced.  Kant's  reduction  of  syllogisms  themselves  to 
one  law  has  made  some  gain.  His  next  step  then  should  be  the  deduction  of 
the  premises  of  syllogisms  from  the  one  principle.  This  would  bring  about  the 
long  dtsired  unity  of  rationalism.  This  goal  our  philosopher  clearly  sees.  Not 
only  does  he  see  it,  but  he  seems  to  think  that  he  has  reached  it.  For  he  com- 
placently says,  "I  close  with  an  observation  which  must  be  agreeable  to  those 
who  can  feel  gratified  over  the  unity  of  human  knowledge.  All  affirmative 
judgments  are  subsumed  under  the  general  formula,  the  principle  of  identity: 
(Cuilibet  subjecto  competit  praedictum  ipsi  identicum)  ;  all  negative  judg- 
ments are  subsumed  under  the  principle  of  contradiction  (Nulli  subjecto  com- 
petit praedictum  ipsi  oppositum).  All  affirmative  syllogisms  are  comprised  in 
the  rule  Ncta  notae  est  etiam  rei  nota  ipsilus;  all  negative  under  the  rule,  Op- 
position notae  opponitur  rei  ipsi."     (§6). 

Gratification  at  this  long  desired  accomplishment,  however,  is  somewhat 
lessened  by  the  obscurity  of  the  connection  between  the  principle  of  identity 
and  the  most  general  rule  of  syllogisms.  Evidently  the  most  general  rule  is  not 
deduced  from  the  principle  of  identity,  for  Kant  has  very  carefully  made  it 
plain  that  it  can  not  be  proven  and  that  it  is  immediately  discerned. 

However,  this  slight  dissatisfaction  is  immediately  swallowed  up  in  the 
confusion  of  mind  following  his  very  next  sentence,  "All  judgments  immedi- 
ately subsumed  under  the  principle  of  identity  or  contradiction,  that  is,  those 
in  which  neither  the  identity  nor  the  opposition  is  recognized  by  an  interme- 
diate mark  (for  example,  not  by  means  of  an  analysis  of  their  ideas)  but  are 
immediately  known,  are  undemonstrable  judgments;  those  which  can  be  medi- 
ately known  are  demonstrable."  Then  the  climax  of  these  statements  comes, 
"Human  knowledge  is  full  of  such  undemonstrable  judgments.  Before  any 
definition  whatever,  some  of  these  judgments  arise  as  soon  as  in  order  to  ob- 
tain a  definition,  one  represents  as  a  mark  of  the  thing,  any  attribute  which 
one  recognizes  next  and  immediately  in  the  thing  itself." 

Should  an  abortive  attempt  at  unifying  all  knowledge  brings  one  back  into 
the  Wolffian  atmosphere.  The  patent  incompleteness  of  Wolff's  system  moved 
Kant  to  attempt  to  perfect  it.  The  total  result  is  that  he  arrives  at  exactly 
the  same  point  as  his  master.  For  the  historian  one  positive  result  comes  from 
the  study  of  this  essay,  namely,  that  Kant  is  awake  to  the  incompleteness  of 
the  current  rationalistic  scheme;  and  secondly  that  he  endeavors  to  complete  it 
by  the  Wolffian  method  of  falling  back  upon  empirical  data.  He  leaves  the 
problem  with  a  law  of  identity,  a  law  of  contradiction,  a  most  general  rule  for 
the  syllogism,  and  an  innumerable  host  of  immediately  perceived  judgments 
surrounded  by  a  more  or  less  hazy  atmosphere  of  "ideas"  and  "sensations." 


CHAPTER  III. 
A  Deduction  of  the  Principal  Idea  of  Rationalism. 

Der  einzig  mogliche  Beweisgrund  zu  einer  Demonstration  des  Dasseins  Got- 
tes  begins  with  a  criticsm  so  vitally  destructive  to  traditional  rationalism  that 
it  seems  no  longer  possible  as  a  method,  but  ends  with  a  sturdy  deductive  argu- 
ment for  the  archetypal  idea  of  the  system.  Part  First  is  devoted  to  the  nega- 
tive and  radical  discovery  that  existence  is  no  predicate  at  all,  and  therefore 
never  a  matter  for  definition  or  deduction.  This  is  in  direct  contradiction  of 
Wolff's  principium  individuatonis  and  hopelessly  destroys  the  possibility  of  mak- 
ing the  rationalistic  method  universal.  The  position,  however,  is  not  fraught 
with  such  dire  results  for  Kant.  He  is  still  blindly  following  the  master-sys- 
tematizer  Wolff,  who,  though  denning  things  so  as  to  include  existence,  never- 
theless forms  his  definitions  from  the  attributes  indubitably  experienced.  As  the 
master's  logic  began  with  "axioms,  definitions,  and  indubitable  experiences," 
Kant  feels  he  has  made  some  advance  when  he  says,  "One  must  not  expect  me 
to  begin  with  a  formal  definition  of  existence.  One  would  almost  wish  that 
this  would  never  occur,  where  it  is  so  unsafe  to  form  a  definition  with  any 
assurance,  which  is  really  the  case  more  often  than  one  would  be  led  to  be- 
lieve. I  will  proceed  as  one  who  seeks  the  definition  and  assures  himself  be- 
forehand of  what  he  can  say  with  certainty,  affirmatively  or  negatively,  of  the 
object  defined,  although  he  has  not  yet  discovered  in  what  the  complete  idea  of 
it  consists."  (Sec.  I,  Obs.  I.)  He  does  not  for  a  moment  perceive  the  essential 
empiricism  of  such  a  process.  His  method  is  really  Wolffian  and  therefore,  to 
him,  rational.  Both  method  and  point  of  view  are  illustrated  in  the  following: 
"If  one  understands  that  our  organized  knowledge  finally  ends  in  unanalyzable 
ideas,  then  one  also  comprehends  that  some  ideas  exist  which  are  nearly  un- 
analyzable, that  is,  those  in  which  the  marks  are  only  a  little  clearer  and  sim- 
pler than  the  things  themselves.  This  is  the  case  with  our  definition  of  exist- 
ence. I  admit  freely  that  through  such  a  definition  the  idea  of  the  thing  de- 
fined would  be  distinct  in  only  a  very  small  degree.  But  the  nature  of  the  ob- 
ject in  its  relation  to  the  power  of  our  understanding  permits  no  higher  de- 
gree." (Sec.  I,  Obs.  I,  §2).  Thus  Kant  agrees  both  with  Leibnitz  who  doubt- 
ed the  possibility  of  complete  analysis,  and  also  with  Wolff  who  overtly  admits 
as  final  data  indubitable  experiences  of  things. 

Such  a  view  is  further  strengthened  by  Kant's  ground  of  proof  for  God's 
existence.  While  omitting  the  perfection  idea  of  both  Leibnitz  and  Wolff  and 
criticising  the  latter's  definition  of  existence  as  "an  elaboration  of  possibility" 
(Sec.  I,  Obs.  I,  §3)  he  nevertheless  seizes  upon  Wolff's  fundamental  notion, 
viz.,  possibility,  and  with  the  test  of  contradiction  deduces  the  existence  of 
God  by  "the  only  possible  argument,"  viz.,  the  purely  rationalistic  one  (Sec. 
I,  Obs.  II,  §§1-4;  Obs.  Ill,  §2). 

Had  Kant  been  a  real  empiricist  depending  wholly  upon  senses  for  final 
certainty,  he  would  have  proceeded  to  adopt  the  cosmological  proof  which  he 
describes  (Sec.  Ill,  §3),  and  which,  he  says,  is  famous  and  popular  through 
the  Wolffian  school  but  is  wholly  impossible  (Sec.  Ill,  §  3).  Instead  he  pro- 
ceeds upon  the  essentially  Leibnitzian  process  of  showing  the  necessity  of  some- 
thing because  of  the  essential  contradiction  of  universal  impossibility  (Sec.  I, 
Obs.  II,  §§2,  3,  4,  Obs.  Ill,  §§1-4).  He  believes  explicitly  that  he  has 
accomplished  his  rationalistic  task.  "The  ground  of  proof  for  the  existence 
of  God,  which  we  have  given   is   completely   built  upon   the   proposition   that 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

something  is  possible.  On  that  account  it  is  a  perfectly  a  priori  proof.  It  is 
developed  neither  from  my  own  nor  any  other  spiritual  existence  nor  from  the 
physical  world.  It  is,  indeed,  taken  from  the  inner  nature  (Kennzeichen)  of 
absolute  necessity."     (Sec.  I,  Obs.  IV,  §4). 

It  is  not  the  purpose  here  to  criticise  the  proof,  except  to  say  it  contains 
the  Leibnitzian  fallacy  of  proceeding  from  general  existence  to  the  particular 
existence  of  God  without  warrant.  The  interesting  fact  to  note  is  that  Kant 
in  his  own  mind  is  emphatically  a  rationalist.  With  the  method  falling  to  pieces 
in  his  very  hands,  he  is  still  possessed  of  the  fatuous  notion  that  somewhere, 
some  time,  by  some  understanding,  the  unanalyzable  notions  will  be  followed 
back  to  their  very  foundation,  "the  necessary  Being,"  the  last  real  ground  of  all 
other  possibility  (Sec.  I,  Obs.  Ill,  §3).  "Since  the  data  of  all  possibility  must 
be  found  in  him,  either  as  conditions  or  as  consequences  given  through  him  as 
the  first  real  ground,  so  it  is  perceived  that  all  reality  of  one  or  the  other  kind 
is  to  be  comprehended  through  him"  (Sec.  I,  Obs.  Ill,  §6).  With  that  the 
last  suspicion  of  any  conscious  empiricism  must  die  out.  All  is  stanchly  ra- 
tional. Even  Kant's  negative  criticisms  are  motived  by  rationalism  and  directed 
really  toward  strengthening  the  system.  He  refuses  to  use  the  empirical  data 
of  self  or  other  existences  or  even  the  perfection  of  God  based  directly  or  in- 
directly upon  his  perceived  attributes  or  works.  Leibnitz  had  been  compelled 
to  posit  a  "disposition  to  exist"  in  ideas  in  order  to  fill  full  his  perfect  world. 
The  Wolffian  school  had  proceeded  from  the  perceived  world  to  God  as  first 
cause.  Kant  rebukes  both  with  a  purer  deduction.  To  save  himself  from  ad- 
mitting existence  as  an  attribute  in  the  definition  of  divine  perfection,  he  inad- 
vertently and  unconsciously  destroys  all  hope  of  discovering  the  existence  of 
things  by  pure  reason  alone  though  he  resolutely  reaffirms  the  possibility  of  it. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
The  Confusion  concerning  the  Principle  of  Sufficient  Reason. 

One  of  the  problems  which  had  constantly  harassed  the  minds  of  rational- 
ists was  the  ground  of  existence  or  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason.  Leib- 
nitz had  labored  to  connect  the  principle  with  the  law  of  contradiction,  but  was 
saved  from  methods  too  easy  and  too  superficial  by  his  keen  ability  to  criticise 
his  own  efforts,  and  prevented,  according  to  Paulsen,  by  the  theological  desire 
to  retain  the  freedom  of  God.  Wolff,  less  religious  and  more  obtuse,  attempted 
the  same  problem  and  gained  the  reputation  for  having  succeeded.  How  super- 
ficial and  empirical  his  solution  was  has  been  shown  above.  Kant  with  his  crit- 
ical faculty  stirred,  but  his  dogmatism  intact,  early  perceives  the  insufficiency  of 
the  solution  and  tries  to  strengthen  it  by  new  arguments. 

In  the  Negativen  Grossen,  he  begins  his  introduction  with  the  proposition 
afterwards  further  fully  developed,  that  "The  use  which  one  can  make  of 
mathematics  in  philosophy  consists  neither  in  an  imitation  of  the  method  of  the 
former  nor  in  the  real  application  of  its  principles  to  the  objects  of  philosophy." 
He  does  admit,  however,  some  applications  which  may  prove  helpful.  Among 
these  is  the  concept  of  negative  quantities,  the  consideration  of  which  leads  to 
the  destruction  of  Kant's  certainty  in  a  large  portion  of  rationalistic  deductions 
by  the  conclusion  that  logical  contradiction  and  real  contradiction  are  two  en- 
tirely different  things.  "I  understand  well  how  a  consequence  can  be  demon- 
strated from  a  ground  by  the  law  of  identity,  because  it  is  discovered  by  analy- 
sis of  the  ideas  contained  in  the  ground  .  .  .  and  this  connection  of  the 
ground  with  the  consequence  I  can  clearly  comprehend  because  the  consequence 
is  really  identical  with  a  part  of  the  fundamental  idea;  and,  since  it  is  already 
comprehended  in  the  ground,  it  is  demonstrated  from  it  by  the  law  of  identity." 

Then  follows  the  criticism  of  the  whole  rationalistic  process  dealing  with 
truths  of  fact:  "How  anything  can  come  from  something  else  but  not  by  the 
law  of  identity  is  something  I  would  gladly  have  made  clear  to  me.  The  first 
kind  of  ground  I  call  logical  ground,  because  the  relation  of  ground  to  the  con- 
sequence can  be  viewed  as  logical,  viz.,  distinctly  according  to  the  law  of  iden- 
tity. The  ground  of  the  second  kind  I  call  real  ground  because  the  relation  in- 
volved certainly  concerns  my  true  ideas,  but  what  kind  of  relation  it  is,  can  be 
in  no  way  determined."  His  terse  summation  of  his  problems  then  is,  "How 
shall  I  comprehend  the  fact  that  because  one  thing  is  some  other  thing  should 
be?"     (Chap.  Ill,  General  remark). 

Such  a  striking  similarity  to  Hume's  problem,  amounting  almost  to  ver- 
bal identity  in  formulation,  has  caused  some  writers,  like  Fischer,  for  example, 
to  insist  stoutly  upon  this  as  proof  final  of  external  empirical  influences.  How- 
ever, as  Paulsen  has  well  noted,  this  very  similarity,  with  absolute  silence  on 
the  source  of  empirical  influence,  makes  a  strong  argument  against  any  such 
assumption.  It  is  inconceivable,  too,  that  Kant  should  have  derived  the  prob- 
lem from  Hume  without  the  Humian  answer.  It  is  equally  inconceivable  that 
Kant  would  have  hesitated  in  his  un-Kantian  indecision  if  he  were  at  this  time 
at  heart  anything  but  a  rationalist.  For  even  after  ruling  out  a  Humian  an- 
swer, there  remained  most  illustrious  examples  in  Wolff's  deductions  of  the  law 
of  sufficient  reason,  in  the  formation  of  ideas,  definitions,  and  even  axioms,  all 
based  upon  inductions  as  clear  as  any  of  Lcke's  or  Hume's.  Paulsen,  at  this 
point,  believes  that  if  Kant  had  given  an  answer  to  the  question,  it  must  have 
been  empirical,  and  cites  Leibnitz  as  giving  such  an  illustration  in  his  deduction 


THE    DECAY    OF    RATIONALISM 

of  the  verites  de  fait.  Without  doubt  Kant  did  have  an  answer,  and  that  em- 
pirical, within  the  borders  of  his  own  school.  He  himself  had  already  included 
large  empirical  sources  in  his  previous  works.  Why  then  did  he  hesitate?  For 
the  simple  reason  that  he  was  a  rationalist.  All  the  previous  empirical  an- 
swers had  viewed  as  merely  incidental  and  temporary,  waiting  for  verification 
by  deduction.  Some  philosophers  of  the  school,  indeed,  and  notably  Wolff,  had 
pretended  to  make,  and  had  received  credit  for  making,  this  final  reduction  of 
all  principles  to  one  by  stringent  analysis.  Though  such  reductions  had  not 
been  altogether  satisfactory,  yet  no  rationalist  doubted  their  ultimate  possibility. 
By  his  critical  investigation,  Kant  had  uncovered,  in  his  discovery  that  logi- 
cal ground  was  different  from  real  ground,  a  fundamental  difficulty  to  the  con- 
summation of  a  method  so  unquestionably  hitherto  accepted.  The  answer,  to 
one  free  from  rationalistic  training,  would  have  been  quick  and  easy;  to  one 
grounded  in  the  school  as  in  a  religion,  accepting  its  primary  assumption  as  a 
dogma,  such  a  sudden,  complete,  and  radical  change  was  impossible.  Really 
Kant's  true  question  was:  By  deduction  how  shall  I  comprehend  the  fact  that 
because  one  thing  is,  some  other  thing  should  be?1 

That  his  solution  of  this  difficulty,  at  which  he  hints  in  the  concluding 
paragraph,  as  well  as  his  motive  for  reaching  it,  are  both  rationalistic  is  shown 
by  these  statements:  "I  have  pondered  over  the  nature  of  our  knowledge 
with  reference  to  our  judgments  concerning  grounds  and  consequences,  and  at 
some  time  I  will  publish  (darlegen)  the  result  of  these  observations."2 

Further,  that  he  thinks  of  this  solution  as  rationalistic  and  not  empirical, 
as  Paulsen  suggests,  nor  Humian,  but  Leibnitzian,  is  at  least  indicated  by  the 
suggestive  sentence:  "There  is  something  important  and  as  it  appears  to  me 
quite  true,  in  the  thoughts  of  Herr  von  Leibnitz:  The  soul  comprehends  the 
whole  universe  in  its  imaginative  faculty,  although  only  an  infinitessimally 
small  part  of  these  perceptions  (Vorstellungen)  are  clear.  In  fact,  all  kinds  of 
ideas  must  rest  upon  the  inner  activity  of  our  spirit  only  as  their  ground.  Ex- 
ternal things  may  well  contain  the  conditions  under  which,  in  one  way  or  an- 
other, they  may  appear  to  consciousness  (sich  hervorthun)  but  do  not  contain 
the  power  to  unfold  themselves  in  their  real  essence  (wirklich  hervorzubringen) . 
The  thinking  faculty  of  the  soul  must  contain  the  real-grounds  for  all  of  them,  as 
far  as  naturally  they  arise  in  it,  and  the  perceptions  (Erscheinungen)  of  all  the 
rising  and  passing  knowledge  are  to  all  appearances  merely  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  this  activiay."3  This  suggestion  of  Leibnitz,  according  to  Paul- 
sen, becomes  afterward  the  thesis  of  the  Dissertation  of  '70:  "Knowledge  of 
facts  by  pure  reason  is  possible  .  .  .  through  this  fact,  that  the  mind 
contains  the  fundamental  principles  of  all  activities  of  knowledge."4  This  as- 
sumption likewise  becomes  the  backbone  of  the  Pure  Reason  and  all  the  new 
Kantian  philosophy. 


iPaulsen  gives  these  reasons  for  not  accepting  Humian  influence:  1.  The 
Humian  formulation  of  the  problem  without  the  Humian  answer.  2.  Had  he 
received  the  problem  from  Hume,  Kant  would  have  named  Hume  with  others 
whom  he  cites.  3.  He  treats  it  as  a  great  dicovery.  4.  Says  he  has  thought 
over  it  some  time.  5.  Promises  a  solution.  6.  Gives  the  negative  but  not  the 
positive  side.  7.  And  approaches  the  problem  altogether  differently  from 
Hume.  8.  Mendelssohn  writing  on  the  same  subject,  does  not  fully  appreciate 
Hume's  skepticism.     (Paulsen,  pp.  49-57). 

2Ibid. 

3Chap.  Ill,  Remarks  on  the  Second  Number. 

4P.,  p.  103. 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    KANT 

The  total  result  from  a  close  study  of  the  Negative  Quantities  in  not,  there- 
fore, so  destructive  of  Kant's  thinking  as  a  superficial  view  would  suggest. 
He  has  not  consciously  surrendered  the  ideal  of  his  method.  As  he  seems  to 
recognize  them,  his  motives  come  wholly  from  the  rationalistic  development  and 
specifically  from  the  unfinished  tasks  of  Wolff.  The  only  solution  hinted  at  is 
distinctly  rationalistic  and  specifically  Leibnitzian.  Within  his  own  school  he 
still  seeks  a  solution  for  a  radical  systemic  defect,  the  seriousness  and  logical 
effect  of  which  he  does  not  yet  fully  comprehend.  Now  he  sees  as  in  a  glass 
darkly;  eventually  he  will  see  face  to  face. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Source  of  Ideas. 

The  suspicion  grows  in  the  reader's  mind  that  during  his  first  essays  in 
the  realm  of  criticism,  Kant  is  somewhat  sensationally  disposed.  He  begins  so 
boldly,  with  such  apparently  sweeping  and  radical  attacks  upon  his  own  school, 
that  one  momentarily  expects  to  see  him  come  out  a  full-fledged  skeptic  or  an 
empiricist  at  least.  However,  just  before  launching  out  upon  new  seas  of 
thought,  he  tacks  about  and  makes  port  again  very  close  to  his  old  moorings. 
At  any  rate,  such  is  the  story  of  the  Deutlichkeit  der  Grundsatze  der  naturlichen 
Theologie  und  der  Moral.  Here  again,  Kant's  critical  talent  is  engaged  with  the 
unfinished  task  of  Wolff,  the  uncertainty  of  the  data,  which  seemed  always 
points  of  exasperating  incentive  for  further  investigation.  The  search  for  data 
began  in  the  Delucidatio,  was  evident  in  the  Falsche  Spitzfindigket,  was  only 
half-satisfied  in  the  Einzig  mogliche  Beweisgrund,  hung  in  absolute  doubt  in  the 
Negativen  Grossen  and  now  in  the  Introduction  reappears  almost  belligerently 
with:  "I  will  allow  therefore,  as  the  sole  content  of  my  treatise  such  principles 
of  experience  and  immediate  consequences  deduced  from  them.  I  will  trust  neith- 
er the  teachings  of  philosophers  whose  uncertainty  is  the  occasion  of  this  pres- 
ent work,  nor  definitions  which  so  often  deceive."  This  he  does  because  he  is 
seeking  to  answer  the  question,  "What  would  be  the  scientific  procedure  by 
which  metaphysics  would  attain  both  its  rightful  degree  of  certainty  and  its 
method?"  Then  follows  one  of  his  radical  departures  from  the  rationalistic 
faith  under  the  topic:  "Mathematics  arrives  at  all  its  definitions  synthetically; 
philosophy,  however,  analytically."  The  text  goes  on  to  elaborate:  "One  can 
arrive  at  every  general  idea  in  two  ways;  either  through  an  arbitrary  synthesis 
of  ideas,  or  through  abstraction  from  that  knowledge  which  has  been  made 
distinct  through  analysis.  Mathematics  arrives  at  definitions  in  no  other  way 
than  the  first.  However,  the  case  is  entirely  different  with  the  definitions  of 
philosophy.  Here  the  idea  of  a  thing  is  already  given,  but  confused  and  not 
sufficiently  distinct."  (Obs.  I,  §  1). 

The  new  position  is  modified,  however,  by  continuing  in  the  analytic  method. 
"It  is  the  business  of  philosophy  to  analyse  ideas  given  confused,  and  make  them 
complete  and  certain.  (Obs.  I,  §1).  Frequent  repetition  of  this  thought  shows 
how  clearly  this  view  is  held. 

The  certainty  of  this  analysis  is  the  next  consideration,  for  it  is  Kant's  ex- 
press purpose  to  search  for  a  method  of  philosophy  or  metaphysics  (both  prac- 
tically identical  in  this  essay,  Obs.  II,  §1)  which  would  give  certainty.  While 
the  second  chapter  is  devoted  largely  to  the  method  of  obtaining  certainty,  his 
third  centers  upon  a  test  of  certainty. 

The  method  for  the  "highest  possible  metaphysical  certainty"  is  succinctly 
reduced  to  two  rules:  "The  first  and  best  is  this:  that  since  a  beginning  is  not 
made  with  definitions,  the  mere  nominal  definition  must  be  sought  somewhere, 
e.  g.  anything  is  necessary  of  which  the  opposite  is  impossible.  But  even  here 
there  are  but  few  cases  where  the  clear,  distant  idea  can  be  confidently  seized 
upon  at  the  beginning.  More  often  one  must  seek  carefully  among  objects  for 
those  elements  which  are  immediately  certain,  even  before  a  definition  is  ob- 
tained therefrom.  Consequences  are  then  drawn  and  attempts  chiefly  made  to 
form  wholly  true  and  certain  judgments  of  the  object  without  dependence  upon 
a  hoped-for  definition  which  must  never  be  attempted  except  when  it  clearly 
offers  itself  from  the  most  patent  judgments." 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    KANT 

"As  a  second  rule,  immediate  judgments  of  objects  should  be  selected  with 
reference  to  those  attributes  which  are  certainly  and  immediately  met  with  in 
the  objects,  and  after  it  is  certain  that  one  attribute  is  not  contained  in  the 
other,  the  judgments  should  be  applied  like  the  axioms  of  geometry  as  founda- 
tions of  all  consequences."  .  .  .  "The  proper  method  of  metaphysics  has 
the  same  fundamental  principles  as  that  which  Newton  introduced  into  natural 
science  and  which  was  frought  with  such  fruitful  results."     (Obs.  II,  §  1). 

So  much  for  method.  Now  for  the  test  of  certainty.  "One  is  certain  in  so 
far  as  one  knows  it  is  impossible  for  a  bit  of  knowledge  to  be  false."     (Obs.  Ill, 

§1) .    "All  true  judgments  must  be  either  affirmative  or  negative 

The  proposition,  therefore,  which  expresses  the  essence  of  every  affirmative 
proposition,  and  consequently  contains  the  most  general  formula  of  all 
affirmative  judgments  is:  To  every  subject  is  properly  assigned  a  predicate 
which  is  identical  with  it.  This  is  the  principle  of  identity."  The  opposite  is 
the  law  of  contradiction.  "Both  together  make  up  the  chief  and  most  general 
principles  in  the  formal  understanding  of  the  whole  human  reason.  .  .  . 
Every  proposition  is  undemonstrable  which  is  immediatley  subsumed  in  thought 
under  one  of  these  most  general  principles  and  cannot  otherwise  be  thought 
i.  e.,  when  either  identity  or  contradict' on  resid.s  immediately  in  ideas  and 
cannot  be  discerned  by  analysis  through  an  intermediate  mark.  All  others  are 
demonstrable."  For  example,  a  body  is  divisable,  is  demonstrable;  but  a  body  is 
composite,  is  immediate,  in  so  far  as  the  predicate  can  be  thought  of  only  as  an 
immediate  and  first  mark  in  the  idea  of  the  body."     (Obs.  Ill,  §3). 

Thus  does  the  much-promising  distinction  between  mathematical  and  philo- 
sophical ideas  melt  down  to  a  perfectly  rational  basis.  If  identity  and  contra- 
diction are  jointly  "the  chief  and  most  general  principles"  of  the  whole  human 
reason,  and  other  propositions  are  subsumed  under  them  either  immediately  or 
mediately,  then  the  original  distinction  of  method  seems  to  disappear.  "Meta- 
physics, therefore,  has  no  other  formal  or  material  grounds  of  certainty  dif- 
ferent in  kind  from  those  of  mathematics."     (Obs.  Ill,  §3). 

The  only  distinction  remaining  is  in  the  origin  of  the  elements  of  the  two 
kinds  of  ideas,  mathematical  and  philosophical.  The  erstwhile  differentiation 
between  the  method  really,  then,  resolves  itself  into  the  question  of  the  data  ol 
the  two  systems;  mathematical  ideas  are  made;  philosophical  ideas  are  given. 
This  latter  source  of  ideas  is  made  necessary  by  the  rejection  of  the  theory 
that  definitions  can  be  made  which  will  include  existence.  This  new  criticism 
of  the  method  of  philosophy  is  merely  a  further  application  of  Kant's  former 
discovery,  and  though  a  radical  departure  from  the  thinking  of  his  day,  yet 
nevertheless,  is  not  after  all  so  important  for  rationalism  as  a  system.  For 
rationalism  had  merely  held  the  mathematical  method  as  an  ideal.  It  was  not 
concerned  vitally  with  making  its  method  absolutely  conform  to  that  of 
mathematics,  but  only  with  making  it  theoretically  dependent  for  all  knowledge 
upon  reason  alone.  Kant's  criticism  therefore,  lies  in  the  first  place,  not  against 
rationalism,  but  against  those  philosophers  who  attempted  to  make  the  meth- 
ods of  the  two  sciences  identical.    He  specifically  mentions  Wolff.     (Obs.  I,  §1). 

On  the  whole,  at  this  period,  Kant  is  a  rationalist  in  intention.  Indubitable 
experience  is  the  source  of  philosophical  ideas;  contradiction  is  its  test;  logic 
is  its  method.  He  may  close  this  little  essay  with  a  satisfied  sigh,  viewing  with 
content  his  logical  structure  resting  upon  the  dogma  that  if  analysis  could  only 
be  carried  far  enough  by  some  superior  reason  even  the  multitude  of  undemon- 
strable judgments  concerning  perceived  attributes  could  be  connected  with  the 
archetypal  concept  of  God  or  Being. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

A  New  Class  of  Ideas  Discovered. 

It  is  generally  accepted  that  the  Dreams  of  a  Ghost-Seer  marks  the  high- 
tide  of  Kant's  skepticism.  So  characteristically  Humian  is  the  viewpoint  that 
writers  like  Fischer  treat  it  as  the  culmination  of  Hume's  influence  begun  in 
the  Negative  Quantities.  Others,  while  not  certain  when  the  original  empirical 
impulse  occurred,  accept  the  Dreams  as  indubitable  evidence  of  motives  derived 
from  external  sources. 

However,  the  similarities  between  the  German  and  the  Scot  are  no  more 
striking  nor  as  significant  here  as  in  the  earlier  work.  If  the  "awakening"  oc- 
curred at  the  time  of  the  Negative  Quantities,  Kant's  progress  in  skepticism 
was  small  indeed.  For  then  the  Dreams  is  very  little  more  than  an  unfinished 
and  partial  comprehension  of  Hume's  sweeping  destructiveness.  Upon  such  a  the- 
ory Kant's  obtuseness  is  intolerable.  If  the  empirical  seed  was  sown  in 
1763,  it  fell  upon  poor  soil  and  the  harvest  1766  was  disappointingly  meager. 

Foi  at  this  period  the  similarities  between  the  two  writers  are  more  super- 
ficial than  real.  Like  those  of  the  Negative  Quantities,  they  lack  certain  essen- 
tials which  cannot  be  accounted  for  in  one  who  is  already  a  disciple  gifted 
with  more  than  ordinary  acuteness.  But  they  can  be  explained  upon  the  sup- 
position of  independent  development  without  doing  violence  to  Kant's  mental 
acumen  nor  to  his  historical  progress 

As  noted  in  the  introduction  above,  Kant's  whole  pre-critical  development 
can  be  viewed  as>  a  search  for  Wolff's  data.  Die  Traume  eines  Geistersehers 
brings  his  long  search  for  the  original  and  primary  idea  to  a  confusing  multi- 
plicity of  ideas.  Besides  the  two  classes  he  has  already  discovered,  another 
class  develops,  the  derivation  and  test  of  which  are  utterly  inexplicable  by  the 
epistemological  method  he  has  been  following.  Neither  logical  analysis  nor 
direct  inspection  apply  to  them.  Mathematical  ideas  are  made,  and  therefore 
contain  as  much  certainty  as  is  put  into  them;  philosophical  ideas  are  con- 
fusedly given  and  need  to  be  made  distinct  and  certain,  according  to  the  law 
of  identity;  but  this  third  class,  like  the  idea  of  spirits,  are  not  perceived  im- 
mediately by  the  senses,  but  found  in  popular  belief.  Yet  for  the  continuance 
of  metaphysics  they  seem  to  demand  both  existence  and  certainty.  "If  the 
idea  of  spirit  could  be  abstracted  from  our  own  experience-concepts,  then  the 
process  of  making  it  clear  would  be  easy,  in  that  it  would  be  merely  necessary 
to  indicate  tho  >e  marks  which  the  senses  make  clear  to  us  in  this  kind  of  beings, 
and  by  which  we  differentiate  them  from  material  beings.  But  now  we  are  con- 
sidering spirits,  even  the  ugh  it  is  doubtful  whether  such  beings  exist  at  all  or 
not.  Therefore  the  idea  of  spiritual  natures  cannot  be  treated  as  one  abstracted 
from  experience.  But  if  it  is  asked:  How  has  this  idea  in  general  been  arrived 
at,  if  not  through  abstraction?  I  answer:  Many  ideas  spring  up  from  obscure 
and  dark  conclusions  occasioned  by  experience,  and  transplant  themselves  upon 
other  experiences  without  the  cognizance  of  either  experience  in  general  or  of 
the  conclusion  which  built  up  the  idea.  Such  ideas  can  be  called  interpolated 
(erschlichende).  Of  such  there  are  many;  some  mere  delusions  of  imagination, 
but  some  indeed  true,  since  not  all  obscure  conclusions  are  erroneous."  (Part  I, 
Chap.  I,  Note.) 

There  is  a  possibility,  however,  of  arriving  at  the  meaning  of  such  ideas. 
For  they  do  acquire  "a  certain  meaning  which  can  be  developed  only  by  bring- 
ing out  this  hidden  sense  by  comparing  all  cases  of  its  application  which  agree 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    KANT 

or  disagree  with  it."     (Part  I,  Chap.  I,  Note.) 

This  perfectly  empirical  method  is  pursued  with  the  idea  of  "spirit"  and 
the  conclusion  is  expressed  in  these  words:  "Finally,  I  either  know  this  little 
of  the  spiritual  attributes  of  my  soul,  or,  if  any  one  does  not  admit  even  that,  I 
am  content  to  know  nothing  at  all  of  it."     (Part  I,  Chap.  I.) 

This  skepticism  concerning  the  soul  enlarges  and  envelopes  the  certainty 
of  relations  and  the  validity  of  metaphysics  itself.  "For  in  the  relations  of 
cause  and  effect,  substance  and  action,  philosophy  is  serviceable  for  analyzing 
perception*-  and  reducing  them  to  simpler  sensations.  But  when  finally  the 
fundamental  relations  are  reached,  then  the  story  of  philosophy  ends,  and  how 
anything  can  be  a  cause  or  possess  any  particular  power  is  always  impossible 
tj  understand  by  reason,  but  such  relations  must  always  be  derived  from  ex- 
perience. For  the  logical  method  proceeds  only  according  to  comparison  by  the 
law  of  identity  and  contradiction.  But  as  far  as  anything  is  a  cause,  something 
is  asserted  on  account  of  something  else,  and  there  is,  therefore,  no  connection 
discoverable  through  the  agreement.  So,  too,  if  one  does  not  wish  to  look 
upon  the  thing  as  a  cause,  no  contradiction  appears;  since  it  is  not  self  contra- 
dictory to  assert  something  and  thereby  eliminate  something  else  (aufheben). 
On  that  account,  the  fundamental  ideas  of  things  as  causes  are  wholly 
arbitrary  and  can  neither  be  proven  nor  contradicted.  .  .  .  All  judgments 
such  as  those  as  to  how  my  soul  moves  my  body,  or  in  what  relation  it  now 
stands  or  will  stand  with  beings  of  the  same  order,  can  be  nothing  more  than 
imaginings  (Erdichtungen)  and  of  far  less  worth  than  those  propositions  of 
natural  sciences  which  are  called  hypotheses.  .      .      .   (Part  II,  Chap.  III.) 

Thuj  does  Kant  reach  his  most  advanced  skeptical  position.  There  re- 
mains nothing  but  immediate  sense-experience  and  induction;  for  these  peculiar 
ideas  of  existences  and  relations  are  independent  of  direct  experiential  verifica- 
tion. The  bounds  set  by  Wolff  to  philosophy  and  the  empirical  test,  co-ordin- 
ated with  contradiction,  have  resulted  in  their  logical  and  natural  outcome.  If 
data  come  from  immediate  experience,  and  immediate  experience  alone  decides 
the  certainty  of  ideas,  what  are  we  to  do  with  those  ideas  of  existence  and  rela- 
tion which  are  not  open  to  inspection  of  this  sort?  To  this  Kant's  preceding 
development  has  no  answer. 

As  Paulsen  well  says,  the  Dreams  of  a  Ghost-Seer  present  nothing  essen- 
tially new.  This  latent  difficulty  has  been  shadowed  forth  over  and  over  again. 
It  came  definitely  into  Kant's  purview  in  the  Negative  Quantities.  Then  it  con- 
cerned causation  alone.  Now  it  has  grown  in  his  comprehension  and  includes 
in  its  skepticism  ideas  clearly  perceived  as  absolutely  essential  to  his  system  of 
rationalism.  Such  a  comprehension  leaves  him  bewildered,  though  his  genius 
is  stopped  but  for  a  time. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Kant's  Position  before  the  Dissertation  of  70. 

In  a  review  of  Kant's  so-called  precritical  development,  two  main  tenden- 
cies are  clear,  both  of  them  based  upon  the  inherited  dualism  of  his  system: 
the  rational  and  the  sensuous  elements  of  the  world. 

With  practically  no  deviation  he  follows  the  rational  method  throughout, 
always  abiding-  by  logical  analysis  and  the  test  of  contradiction  for  the  devel- 
opment of  distinct  ideas.  On  the  other  hand,  he  accepted  the  admission  of  sen- 
suous knowledge  as  piactically  expedient,  but  theoretically  unnecessary,  for 
the  data  of  his  system.  The  one  increasing  purpose  of  what  has  been  mis- 
takenly called  his  empirical  career,  was  in  fact  the  continuous  and  earnest  at- 
tempt to  follow  these  data  to  their  sources  and  to  connect  them  with  the  other 
half  oi  hi.-  system.  In  this  pursuit — in  purpose,  steadfastness,  acuteness,  and 
originality — he  was  much  nearer  to  Leibnitz  than  to  Wolff,  though  all  evidence 
points  to  the  theory  that  he  received  from  the  latter  his  first  and  chief  con- 
ception of  rationalism. 

In  this  starch  for  the  data,  the  empirical  portion,  once  admitted  as  "con- 
fused ideas"  given  in  the  senses,  takes  on  constantly  more  and  more  importance 
and  steadily  advances  to  a  place  in  Kant's  thinking  equivalent  to  the  co-ordin- 
ation of  such  knowledge  with  the  rational  as  found  in  Wolff.  This  came  about 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Kant  was  seriously  and  vigorously  engaged  in  strength- 
ening the  weak  points  of  deduction  and  apparently  succeeded  in  shutting  many 
doors  of  entranc«  to  sensuous  knowledge  by  reducing  Wolff's  generous  array  of 
data — axioms,  definitions,  demonstrated  propositions,  and  indubitable  experi- 
ences— to  confused  ideas  and  immediate  judgments.  Beginning  incidentally  in 
the  Delucidatio,  this  empirical  admixture  enlarges  in  the  False  Subtlety,  passes 
beyond  control  in  the  Only  Ground  of  Proof;  becomes  hopeless  of  solution  in 
the  Negative  Quantities,  and  involving  even  the  existence  of  God — the  key-stone 
to  the  whole  of  rationalism — in  the  Dreams  of  a  Ghost-Seer  brings  down  the 
whole  system  in  a  ma^s  of  skeptical  confusion. 

For  motives  it  is  never  once  necessary  to  go  outside  of  the  German  school 
and  hardly  beyond  Wolff.  Given  the  loose  construction  of  the  latter  and  the 
vigorous,  clear cit  mind  of  Kant,  and  the  result  is  inevitable.  Always,  too,  it 
must  be  kept  in  mind  that  Kant  is  a  rationalist — genuine,  devoted,  dogmatic  in 
his  belief  that  it  was  the  all-sufficient  and  one  method  needful.  From  it  he 
never  voluntarily  departs;  all  his  efforts  are  toward  building  it  afresh.  His 
movements  toward  emph  icism  come  from  his  conception  of  rationalism  as  in- 
herited from  Wolff,  whose  basic  assumptions  drive  Kant's  incessantly  inquiring 
mind  always  onward  toward  the  very  point  he  wishes  most  to  avoid.  He  is  a 
powerful  swimmer,  but  battles  against  a  current  too  strong  for  him. 

Out  of  the  confusion  in  which  he  at  last  finds  himself,  several  points  emerge 
with  clearness: 

1.  He  has  not  given  up  rationalism  wholly.  Certain  ideas  are  given  in  ex- 
perience, confused  and  reouiring  analysis  to  make  them  distinct.  The  Principle 
of  Contradiction  is  the  touchstone  by  which  they  are  to  be  tried  out. 

2.  Certain  ether  ideas — like  those  of  mathematics — are  the  result  of  syn- 
thesis and  contain  as  much  certainty  and  as  many  relations  as  are  first  put  into 
them.     They  too  must  conform  with  the  Principle  of  Contradiction. 

3.  Still  another  class  of  ideas  are  neither  made  by  the  reason  nor  given  by 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    KANT 

sense-experiences,  though  they  insist  upon  their  right  to  stand  for  existing 
things.  Such  ideas  arc  notions  of  spirits,  cause,  unity,  necessity,  etc.,  all  of 
which  rest  upon  time  cr  space  relations.  Of  these  there  is  no  verification  save 
that  of  uncertain  induction.  Such  notions  lie  beyond  immediate  experience  and 
yet  upon  them  rests  the  certainty  of  a  whole  realm  of  human  knowledge.  They 
comprise  that  great  mass  of  experience  common  to  the  sceiences  and  called  meta- 
physics. Without  certainty  here,  metaphysics  is  impossible.  So  emerges  the 
final  question:  Whence  shall  certainty  come? 

With  Teutonic  immutability  fairly  developed,  with  a  devotion  to  certainty 
and  truth  quite  dogmatic;  with  an  awakened  and  independent  spirit  of  investi- 
gation, with  momentum  at  its  maximum,  and  finally  with  a  solution  in  his  own 
school  and  incipiently  in  hir  own  mind,  is  the  result  in  doubt? 


i 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
How  Certainty  Arises  in  the  Knowledge  of  Things. 

During  the  years  between  1766  and  1770  Kant  was  in  a  state  of  mental 
perturbation.  His  long  training  in  physics"  and  equally  deep  schooling  in  ra- 
tionalism made  it  impossible  for  him  to  remain  in  the  skepticism  of  the  Dreams. 
Confronted  at  last  with  the  skeptical  consequences  of  his  hybrid  system,  he  set 
to  work  to  find  a  solution.  How  great  were  the  gropings  of  this  period,  is 
indicated  by  his  cry  of  a  "great  light"  in  1769.1  This  light  is  presumably 
reflected  in  the  Dissertation  of  '70.  In  it  he  "flatters  himself"  that  he  has 
come  upon  those  ideas  which  he  need  not  change  and  through  which  he  can  test 
with  surety  and  ease  all  kinds  of  metaphysical  questions  and  decide  them  with 
certainty.2 

Such  statements  as  these  are  suggestive  of  both  the  continuity  of  Kant's 
preceding  thought  and  the  confusion  of  1766.  The  key  words  of  the  expressions 
well  state  not  only  his  gropings  since  that  date,  but  also  the  primary  motives 
of  his  long  development.  At  last  he  has  found  his  data  and  his  method,  and 
fcund  them  by  a  complete  restatement  of  theory  of  human  knowledge.  For,  as 
many  have  noted,  his  Dissertation  contains  the  germ  of  all  the  later  problems 
and  solutions  developed  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.3 

The  general  thesis  at  last  insures  certainty  in  our  knowledge  of  existences. 
Two  general  divisions  are  discernable,  constructive  and  destructive;  the  first 
devoted  to  showing  the  possibility  and  necessity  of  the  new  thesis  (Sections 
I-IV) ;  and  the  second,  to  showing  the  futility  of  trying  rationally  to  connect 
by  logical  analysis  ideas  and  things    (Section  V). 

Instead  of  endeavoring  to  bring  certainty  into  the  whole  system  by  somehow 
bridging  the  chasm  between  truths  of  reason  and  truths  of  fact,  he  frankly 
recognizes  the  division  and  emphasizes  the  permanency  of  distinction  between 
the  sensible  and  intelligible  (Section  II,  3-7),  and  gains  his  desired  end  by  in- 
troducing a  co-ordinate  certainty  into  things  sensible,  not  by  the  Wolffian 
device  of  "indubitable  experience,"  but  by  the  well-known  "forms"  of  time  and 
space   (§§  4,  11,  13-15). 

The  Traume  left  him  with  three  kinds  of  ideas  as  his  data;  those  given 
confused  in  sense  experience,  those  arbitrarily  made,  and  those  neither  made 
nor  perceived  but  found  in  popular  belief.  By  his  new  solution  he  has  found 
a  sure  ground  for  the  first  class.  Their  source  is  still  sensibility,  but  now  each 
one  is  so  derived  that  the  unknowable  sensation  portion  is  informed  with  a 
priori  time  and  pace  forms,  giving  them  universality  and  certainty  independent 
of  observation.  (§  11). 

The  second  class,  comprising  the  mathematical,  and  formerly  containing 
only  arbitrary  certainty,  by  the  same  means  now  rises  to  the  dignity  of  absolute 
certainty,  so  that  "pure  mathematics,  then,  expounding  the  form  of  our  entire 
sensuous  cognition,  is  the  organon  of  all  intuitive  and  distinct  knowledge, 
.      .      .    (and)   it  confers  cognition  perfectly  true  .      .      ."   (§  12). 

Finally  the  third  class,  those  arising  neither  from  sense  experience  nor 
from  arbitrary  synthesis,  such  as  "possibility,  existence,  necessity,  substance, 


*Vierter  Reflectionen  der  Reinen  Vernunft,  Erdmann. 
2Hartenstein,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  662,  Letter  to  Lambert  in  1770,  quoted  by  Paul- 
sen, p.  101. 

•{P.,  Chap.  3,  p.  101,  and  note,  Hartenstein,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  681. 


THE    RATIONALISM    OF    KANT 

cause,  which  never  enter  as  parts  into  any  sensuous  representation"  (§  8),  and 
are  yet  found  among  common  beliefs,  and  which  led  to  the  large  skepticism  of 
the  Traume,  "are  given  by  the  very  nature  of  the  intellect,  are  not  abstracted 
from  any  use  of  the  senses,  and  do  not  contain  any  form  of  sensuous  knowledge 
as  such"  (§§  6,8). 

Thereupon  follows  the  sweeping  criticism  of  all  his  long  and  vain  attempts 
of  previous  years  and  his  deliberate  rejection  of  rationalism  as  it  had  been 
taught  him  though  with  a  certain  gentleness  for  his  old  master.  "From  the 
foregoing  it  will  be  seen  that  the  sensuous  is  badly  expounded  to  call  it  the 
more  confusedly  known  and  the  intellectual  the  distinctly  known.  For  these 
are  only  logical  distinctions  and  plainly  do  not  touch  the  data  underlying  all 
logical  comparison  .  .  .  The  writer  fears  that  Wolff  by  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  sensuous  and  the  intellectual,  which  to  him  is  only  logical,  checked, 
perhaps,  wholly,  and  to  the  great  detriment  of  philosophy,  that  noble  enterprise 
of  antiquity  of  discussing  the  nature  of  phenomena  and  noumena,  turning  us 
from  the  investigation  of  these  to  what  are  frequently  but  logical  trifles"  (§  7). 
Thus  in  his  own  mind  Kant  connects  Wolff  both  with  his  most  fundamental  and 
long-studied  difficulties,  and  with  their  final  solution.  In  fact,  he  still  retains 
the  Wolffian  use  of  reason  "in  sciences  whose  primitive  concepts  as  well  as 
axioms  are  given  by  the  sensuous  intuition,"  where  the  use  "is  only  logical,  that 
is,  by  it  we  only  subordinate  cognitions  to  one  another  according  to  their  rela- 
tive universality  conformably  to  the  principle  of  contradiction,  phenomena  to 
more  general  phenomena,  and  consequences  of  pure  intuition  to  intuitive 
axioms."  But  in  metaphysics  the  distinctive  Kantian  procedure  is  manifest.  Here 
the  intellect  finds  its  real,  not  its  logical  use,  though  it  still  depends  in  some 
degree  upon  data  "where  the  primary  concept  of  thing's  and  relations  and  the 
very  axioms  are  given  originally  by  the  pure  intellect  itself"  (§  23). 

So  the  old  rationalism  disappears  and  the  new  arises  to  take  its  place. 
The  problem  of  the  old  is  surrendered;  for  the  problem  of  the  new  is  not  with 
real  things  and  ideas,  but  with  things  as  they  appear  in  consciousness  with 
their  certainty  guaranteed  by  the  dispositions  of  the  sensibility  and  intellect. 
To  some  extent  in  nomenclature,  and  much  more  in  general  attitude,  we  are 
periliously  near  the  virtual,  innate  ideas  of  the  Leibnitzian  soul  with  its  capaci- 
ties, preformations,  and  dispositions,  except  that  it  has  required  the  revolu- 
tionary daring  of  the  Konigsberg  philosopher  to  endow  sensibility  with  similar 
preformations  and  dispositions. 

Looking  upon  Kant's  development  as  a  whole,  we  see  it  grow  from  the 
unfinished  problems  of  Wolff.  Beginning  with  the  latter 's  unsatisfactory  reduc- 
tion of  all  principals  to  one,  Kant  was  urged  on  and  on  by  increasingly  deeper 
investigations  into  his  master's  data,  finding  the  concept  of  God  at  first  self- 
ervident  and  finally  doubtful,  puzzled  again  and  again  over  the  possibility  of 
knowing  things,  and  brought  to  a  halt  by  the  nature  and  derivation  of  the 
sufficient  reason.  Finally,  however,  still  led  by  motives  in  the  older  rationalism, 
ho  makes  a  daring  application  of  the  principle  of  innateness  and  so  apparently, 
for  a  time  at  lease,  presents  a  new  and  startling  restatement  of  the  nature  of 
experience. 

In  the  long  process  is  there  a  necessity  for  empirical  influences  external 
to  the  rational  school?  Apparently  not.  One  stage  merges  into  another,  one 
motive  suggests  another,  one  problem  reveals  another  in  a  fairly  orderly  array, 
until  the  weakness  of  the  method  shows  itself  at  last  in  complete  insufficincy 
and  demands  a  total  readjustment. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED  <■ 

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\vt) 

^OTOOW'tt                                V^&&j^™* 

